


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26 JULY 1989



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ANGOLA

Use of New 'Cyanide-Based Nerve Gas' by Government Forces Alleged
34000562 Johannesburg *SUNDAY STAR* in English
28 May 89 p 2

[Article by Vivien Horler]

[Text] A new form of cyanide-based nerve-gas is being used against civilians and Unita [Union for the Total Independence of Angola], in southern Angola against which conventional Nato-developed antidotes are worse than useless—they make the victims sicker.

A Belgian professor of toxicology returned from Jamba in southern Angola this week and slammed the "hypocrisy" of the West for not taking a stand against the MPLA's [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola], use of gas.

Professor Aubin Heyndrickx, head of the department of toxicology at the University of Ghent, said he had personally seen 30 patients over the past three years. Unita's health authorities knew of 400 people affected, but Professor Heyndrickx said there were undoubtedly many more who had died.

Symptoms of the gassing include permanent blindness, paralysis, incontinence and memory-loss. "You could call them cabbages—or living cadavers."

The new agent was entirely different from that he had encountered used by Iraq against Iranians in the Middle East, said Professor Heyndrickx.

The most sinister effect of the gas was that when the known Nato antidotes were administered to the victims, they became worse instead of better.

Professor Heyndrickx and a team of four doctors first visited southern Angola at the request of Unita leader Dr Jonas Savimbi in 1986.

The European doctors were soon convinced that they were looking at the victims of some type of chemical attack.

The team sent a report to the United Nations and the Disarmament Committee in Geneva, and their findings were mentioned in the press, "but nothing happened."

Last year the team returned to find more cases and last month they went back again.

"Reports arrived that a new type of bomb had been used at Cuito Canavale. A German journalist went to the site of the bomb explosion three and a half days later, wearing protective gear but without the correct boots, and he developed a line of red dermatotoxicity on his legs, which were red, itchy and sore.

"He returned with samples of seeds and leaves for us to analyze, and photographs of fragments of the bomb, and these carried a Russian inscription. It was a Russian binary bomb.

"When we analyzed the samples we found evidence of a strange cyanide complex that we had never encountered."

The team of doctors took samples back to Europe with them, but the Nato computers were unable to identify specifically what was in the gas.

Professor Heyndrickx said: "I wanted to take five patients from Jamba, including two children and a blind boy of 15, back to Belgium with me for treatment and testing, but they were refused visas.

"This is because the Belgian government is negotiating with the Luanda authorities over the Benguela railway.

"I am very disappointed about this, as Belgium and the Western countries have signed all the conventions and make all the fuss about human rights, but when it comes to taking a stand and doing something to stop people being gassed, nothing is done.

"In Europe they don't believe us when we say people are being gassed. It took four years before the West believed that 'yellow rain' was being used in Laos and Cambodia, and it took three years before the West accepted that Iraq was using chemical warfare.

"Now in Angola it's been three years too. I say to the generals, if you don't believe me, go to the battlefields without any kind of protective clothing and see what happens. If you return healthy, then you're right. If you don't return at all, I'm right.

"But no one has come."

Support Reiterated for Indian Ocean Peace Zone Conference

*OW1407015389 Beijing XINHUA in English
0035 GMT 14 Jul 89*

[Text] United Nations, July 13 (XINHUA)—China today reiterated its support for the early convening of an international conference on the Indian Ocean to make it a zone of peace.

Ambassador Ding Yuanhong, acting permanent representative of China to the United Nations, urged great powers to respect the self-determination, independence and sovereignty of the countries in the Indian Ocean region and cease all aggressions and subversions against those countries.

The Chinese ambassador made the statement here this morning at a commemorative meeting of the ad hoc committee on the ocean on the 10th anniversary of the 1979 meeting of the littoral and hinterland states of the Indian Ocean.

The final document of the 1979 meeting called for the withdrawal of great powers' forces and bases from the Indian Ocean, denuclearization of the region, the non-use of force by states and guarantees for freedom of navigation in the Indian Ocean.

Ambassador Ding said that the ad hoc committee should seize upon the "auspicious international political climate" to facilitate an early convening of the conference on the Indian Ocean.

The committee is currently meeting in New York to prepare for the conference which is scheduled to be convened next year in Colombo, Sri Lanka. The conference, originally set for 1981, has been postponed five times due to differences among committee members.

The Chinese representative noted today that the military activities of the great powers in the Indian Ocean are the principal cause of insecurity in the region.

However, he said, the littoral and hinterland states in the region must also renounce the threat or use of force and reaffirm their commitment to the peaceful settlement of disputes.

"All countries are obliged to ensure the non-nuclear status of the region," he said. The nuclear weapon states should provide assurances against the use of nuclear weapons against states of the region.

He declared that, while China supports the right of developing countries to peacefully develop nuclear energy resources, it also adheres to the principle of nuclear weapons non-proliferation.

He said, "China neither practises nuclear weapons proliferation, nor does it help other countries to develop such weapons."

He hoped that today's commemorative meeting would provide renewed impetus for the convening of the conference on the Indian Ocean next year.

Daya Perera of Sri Lanka, chairman of the ad hoc committee, noted in his statement that there has been an increase in great power rivalries and conflicts in the region in the past 10 years, creating difficulties for the committee in preparing for the conference.

The prolonged presence of the major powers in the Indian Ocean represents a threat to international peace and security, he said.

He vowed that the committee will comply with the wishes of the General Assembly and complete its preparatory work for the conference this year so that it can be held in 1990 as scheduled.

JAPAN

Socialist Party Urges Enacting 'Nonnuclear Policy' Into Law

*OW0807035689 Tokyo KYODO in English
0923 GMT 7 Jul 89*

[Text] Tokyo, July 7 KYODO—Japan Socialist Party [JSP] Chairwoman Takako Doi proposed on Friday to enact Japan's three-point nonnuclear policy into law.

Doi, speaking at a press conference in Nakatsu, Oita Prefecture, said Japan's non-nuclear policy needs to be strengthened as clearly shown by the recent disclosure that a hydrogen bomb was lost overboard from the U.S. aircraft carrier Ticonderoga in 1965 in waters off Okinawa.

A "no nukes" law is necessary to enforce and verify Japan's nonnuclear policy banning possession, production and introduction of nuclear arms on Japanese soil, Doi said.

The hydrogen bomb was lost on December 5, 1965, when an A-4E Skyhawk strike aircraft rolled off the flight deck of the Ticonderoga and sank in waters 320 kilometers east of Okinawa.

Doi also called for holding an international conference to discuss confidence building measures in the northwestern Pacific region.

Meanwhile, Democratic Socialist Party leader Eiichi Nagasue proposed holding a meeting of the heads of four opposition parties after the July 23 House of Councillors election to discuss compromise on matters of basic policy differences in pursuit of a formula to unify the opposition camp.

Nagasue, who spoke at a news conference in Nagoya, said the opposition parties need to adopt joint policies on defense and energy in order to establish an opposition coalition government.

Doi and Nagasue are both on nationwide stumping tours begun Wednesday to solicit voter support in the upper chamber election.

SOUTH KOREA

Editorial Questions ROK Participation in SDI

*SK1607094289 Seoul HANGYORE SINMUN
in Korean 9 Jul 89 p 6*

[Editorial: "Participation in 'Star Wars' Is Founded on Misjudgment"]

[Text] ROK participation in the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) which is commonly called "Star Wars," seems to be certain, despite the world's heightening criticism of this project.

As is well known, the U.S. SDI is an attempt to turn into reality a science-fiction story in which the United States intercepts Soviet nuclear missiles in the sky and neutralizes them, by mobilizing all kinds of the ultramodern technology. Ever since former President Reagan proposed the SDI in March 1983, it has been extensively criticized not only in the United States but around the world. So far, the United States and the Soviet Union have maintained nuclear strategies capable of retaliation against each other, thereby maintaining a balance of horror. However, those who object to SDI maintain that if the United States were able to make a preemptive attack on the Soviet Union fearlessly because of SDI, the balance would be broken, increasing the danger of nuclear war. Those who object also take into account another important point—that the stage of nuclear war should not be extended into the space. Even the technical evaluation bureau of the U.S. Congress made clear its opposition to SDI in its report, stating that the complete defense system of SDI is technically impossible, that this project will accelerate the arms race, and that this project will require the astronomical expenditure of \$1000 to \$1500 billion.

The way to save mankind from the danger of nuclear war is not nuclear balance but the reduction and ultimate abolition of nuclear arms. However, since the Reagan administration, the U.S. Government strategy has been to conduct an indefinite competition of offensive and defensive weapons based on "superiority through strength." In view of the principle that the arms buildup of major powers inevitably brings about a vicious circle and invites the other side's countermeasures, SDI runs counter to mankind's ardent aspiration for the abolition of nuclear weapons.

The U.S. attempt to drag its "allies" into this defense project is an attempt to have them share the enormous expenditure of this project and to continuously hold its dominant position in modern technology. It has been revealed that the ROK will participate in this project, spending 578.9 billion won in the coming 5-15 years under the pretext of transfer of modern technology.

Apart from the fundamental problems of SDI, why should the ROK spend such an enormous amount of money for this project, which is intended for the defense of the United States? Moreover, there is no guarantee that the SDI project will not be altered or canceled. It has already been revealed, as in the secret SDI agreement between the United States and West Germany, that the benefits of technology transfer, which the ROK Government publicizes, are not all that great, because the United States has the right to make the final judgment as to the classification of confidential technology. The ROK participation in SDI—even the effects of the technology transfer, which are doubtful—should be seriously reconsidered.

ALBANIA

Bucharest Warsaw Pact PCC Session Examined *AU1807173489 Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian* *11 Jul 89 p 4*

[Sokol Gjoka article: "Soviet Goals and the Warsaw Pact"]

[Text] A meeting of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee [PCC] concluded 2 days ago in Bucharest. As was pointed out by the news agencies, this was considered to be one of the most important meetings because of the tensions observed recently within the alliance. The seven leaders of the Warsaw Pact countries signed a declaration at the conclusion of the meeting, through which they replied to the proposals made by U.S. President Bush at the NATO summit held toward the end of May, calling for a 20 percent cut in American and Soviet conventional arms in Europe, a reduction of their troops down to a limit of 275,000, and, following a possible agreement on these problems, the possibility of considering the reducing of short-range missiles on the old continent.

However, despite numerous proposals and declarations about disarmament, the fact remains that a mutual spirit of mistrust continues to exist between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, each side seeking to secure an advantage over the other. In the final declaration of the Bucharest meeting, the Warsaw Pact leaders called on NATO to present concrete proposals concerning a reduction of conventional arms at the Vienna conference. Meanwhile, they expressed their "concern" in connection with NATO's plans for the modernization of tactical nuclear weapons. Under present conditions, the Warsaw Pact countries are more predisposed than the NATO countries to make reductions in the military field because of the economic reforms being carried out in their countries. Under these circumstances, the Warsaw Pact countries need to free large sums, which can only come from a reduction in military expenditure. The Soviet Union is seeking to benefit from this difficult situation in the alliance. The great difficulties encountered by perestroika dictate the need to find large financial resources and these can be found in the field of reducing arms expenditure. Through its proposals for partial reductions of troops and armaments, the Soviet Union is seeking to lighten its military commitment within the bloc, which represents a heavy burden on its economy, at the same time maintaining and strengthening its leading role within the Warsaw Pact. In the name of the alliance, Moscow is thus seeking to lead the current Vienna negotiations on the reduction of conventional weapons, with which the short-range nuclear missile question is also linked.

There have been reports that the Warsaw Pact summit took place in an atmosphere of contradictions and disagreements. In the speech he delivered at a dinner

marking the conclusion of the meeting, Gorbachev himself called on the allied countries to leave aside their disagreements. The Soviet leader tried to preserve the "unity" of the alliance by declaring that "each country and each party in East Europe can follow its own road toward democracy." The Soviet leader declared his support for a broader economic cooperation between the Warsaw Pact countries, on the one hand, and the West on the other. He did this at a time when Moscow is concluding important economic agreements with various European countries. There are currently about 900 joint enterprises with foreign capital in the Soviet Union. At the Bucharest meeting itself, contradictory opinions were also voiced with regard to the major problems pertaining to East-West relations. The question of the way in which the Warsaw Pact countries build their relations with the West has always been a matter of controversy between the Soviet Union, which is seeking to control these relations on the one hand, and the other Warsaw Pact members, who want to escape this control, on the other. Last Sunday, President Bush began a visit to Poland and will then go on to Hungary. Moscow has not opposed this visit, although its interest in it is also obvious. The Warsaw Pact meeting showed the Soviet Union's interest in preserving its leading role in the alliance regardless of changing circumstances, regardless of whether steps are being undertaken in the direction of rearmament or whether proposals are made for disarmament.

BULGARIA

Politburo Approves Pact Bucharest Session *AU1707181389 Sofia RABOTNICHESKO DELO in* *Bulgarian 14 Jul 89 p 1*

[BTA report: "At the BCP Central Committee Politburo—Toward a Peaceful, Safer, and More Democratic World"]

[Text] The Politburo of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party [BCP] discussed and approved a briefing on the results of the conference of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact Member Countries, which took place on 7 and 8 July 1989 in Bucharest.

The activity of the Bulgarian delegation led by Comrade Todor Zhivkov, general secretary of the BCP Central Committee and State Council chairman, was assessed highly.

The Politburo supported the tendency toward further strengthening the political character of the Warsaw Pact. It assessed as positive the usefulness of the exchange of opinions and experience that took place, related to the processes of renewal in the allied countries, and stressed that the discussion of these matters essentially enriched the practice of socialist construction in the fraternal countries, and that it will facilitate the solution of their specific and common problems.

The Politburo fully approved the balanced and realistic analysis of the situation in Europe and the world contained in the documents that were signed. Strengthening and accelerating the positive tendency in international life will further remain the allied countries' main task. Simultaneously, the Politburo shared the concern voiced at the meeting in connection with certain attempts to destabilize the situation in the separate socialist countries, including those in the Balkans, and asserted that those attempts are a part of more general plans aimed against socialism as a social system.

The Politburo approved the practical new steps aimed at strengthening security in Europe and throughout the world, eliminating the nuclear and chemical weapons, and conducting talks on tactical nuclear weapons, and reducing armed forces, weapons, and military budgets. It highly assessed the USSR's readiness to adopt new unilateral steps in the area of tactical nuclear weapons, if NATO agrees to negotiate on this matter.

The declaration of the Warsaw Pact member countries, signed at the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee, reflects in the spirit of the new political thinking and in a synthesized manner the general views on the future of Europe and the world, it points out the roads toward the practical implementation of restructuring in interstate relations, and stresses all-European values and interests. The principles and tenets that will lead the allied countries in implementing their peaceful foreign policy occupy an important place in the declaration. The declaration also contains a constructive reply to the proposals reflected in the documents of NATO's 1989 Brussels session.

Considering issues of military cooperation within the Warsaw Pact framework, the Politburo pointed out that the transition toward the practical implementation of the principles of reasonable sufficiency that are incorporated in the defense strategy of the organization requires intensified cooperation within the framework of the Joint Armed Forces of the allied countries.

The Politburo noted with satisfaction that the sincere, friendly, and constructive spirit in which the meeting took place fully corresponds to the contemporary realities and the level of the allied socialist countries' relations. It approved the line of improving and democratizing the mechanisms of cooperation in all areas as a priority direction in the policy of the Warsaw Pact states,

Highly assessing the results of the Bucharest meeting of the Political Consultative Committee, the Politburo stressed that now the main efforts must be directed toward the practical implementation of its decisions. It expressed a deep conviction that the unity and cooperation of the Warsaw Pact member countries in implementing their noble goals in the international arena will

facilitate the rapid solution of their urgent and responsible internal tasks. At the same time, the implementation of the ideas incorporated in the documents that have been adopted in Bucharest will represent a step along the road toward a peaceful, safer, and more democratic world.

ERRATUM: Army Daily Outlines Warsaw Pact's Past, Future Role
AU1207132589

The following erratum pertains to the item published in the JPRS Report ARMS CONTROL of 19 July 1989, JPRS-TAC-89-029, on page 16, headlined "Army Daily Outlines Warsaw Pact's Past, Future Role." Paragraph two, line 15 should read as follows:

...economic, moral, and political victory over fascism won by the Soviet warriors....

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Pact PCC Statement, Communiqué Officially Approved
LD1407134289 Prague CTK in English
1300 GMT 14 Jul 89

[Text] Prague July 14 (CTK)—The Presidium of the Czechoslovak Communist Party Central Committee and the Federal Government approved the statement "For a Stable and Safe Europe, Free of Nuclear and Chemical Weapons, for a Substantial Reduction of Armed Forces, Armament and Arms Spendings" and a communiqué adopted at the Warsaw Treaty Political Consultative Committee [PCC] session in Bucharest on July 7-8.

In a statement issued today, the two organs supported the positions of the allied countries on international issues discussed at the session, voicing firm determination to carry out the tasks laid down at the session.

The party Presidium and the government stressed the significance of the active policy of socialist countries due to which certain positive changes occurred in international development. They welcomed the hopefully developing Vienna talks on conventional armed forces and on measures to build confidence and security, and regarded the reduction and elimination of tactical nuclear weapons as a key question of security and stability in Europe.

The two organs also stated that favourable changes in international relations have not yet become irreversible and that the situation in the world remains complicated and full of contradictions.

Czechoslovakia will work actively for disarmament to become a continuous and irreversible process, for security to be ensured by political and not only by military means, for cooperation and mutual understanding, the statement said.

CSSR Delegate Describes Vienna CSCE Talks

*AU1407141289 Prague CTK in English
1326 GMT 14 Jul 89*

[Text] Vienna July 14 (CTK correspondent)—The Vienna talks of the 35 Helsinki Final Act signatories about measures to build confidence and security had a matter-of-fact and constructive character in their second round, head of the Czechoslovak delegation to the talks Ladislav Balcar has told CTK. He said the Warsaw Treaty countries suggested an extensive project of developing steps adopted at the 1986 Stockholm conference and new security-building measures, mainly improvement of the regime of announcements, observations and control of activities of naval and air forces. The Czechoslovak delegation took active part in working out common positions of the Warsaw Treaty countries, and was coauthor of two proposals—for preliminary announcement of air force activities and for limiting activities of army, air force and navy in the zone from the Atlantic to the Urals. "In the second round we focused on asserting the military aspects of the Czechoslovak initiative to form a zone of confidence and cooperation along the borderline between the Warsaw Treaty and NATO countries", Ladislav Balcar said. He added that a new phenomenon at the talks was a discussion about military doctrines, whose preparation developed in the second round. The debate should result in a comprehensive consideration of military doctrines by all participants in the talks in a special seminar. A positive element in the round which just ended was a proposal submitted by the group of neutral and nonaligned countries, which is a certain compromise between positions of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO.

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Official Statements on Pact PCC Meeting in Bucharest

Party-Government Statement

*AU1707143389 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND
in German 14 Jul 89 p 1*

["Joint Statement of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, the State Council, and the GDR Council of Ministers; Warsaw Pact States Consistently Continue Policy of Peace, Disarmament, and Cooperation; On the Results of the Meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact States in Bucharest on 7-8 July 1989"]

[Text] The Politburo of the Central Committee of the Socialist unity Party of Germany [SED], the State Council and the GDR Council of Ministers have accepted the report of Erich Jonecker, general secretary of the SED Central Committee and chairman of the GDR State Council, on the meeting of the Political Consultative

Committee [PCC] of the Warsaw Pact states in Bucharest on 7-8 July 1989. They were in agreement with it and gave thanks for the work achieved under the leadership of Comrade Erich Honecker.

In a moment full of responsibility for international development the allied socialist states discussed the main directions of their cooperation in the interests of peace and stability in Europe, disarmament, the deepening of international dialogue and equal cooperation. In the published documents they summarize their fundamental approach and their proposals for a comprehensive program to render the change, from confrontation to cooperation lasting and irreversible. It is of great international consequence that the participant states again affirmed in Bucharest their determination to consistently continue their policy of peace, disarmament, and cooperation.

SED Central Committee Politburo, the State Council, and the Council of Ministers of the GDR emphatically support the appeal to the NATO member states to help strengthen the improvement in the international arena and to support this—following the example of the USSR, the GDR and other socialist countries—with adequate disarmament measures. That would benefit the international climate and increase trust among the states.

The participant states of the Warsaw Pact are geared toward rapidly and purposefully continuing the negotiations on halving the strategic offensive weapons of the USSR and the United States, reducing and banning nuclear weapons tests, banning and destroying chemical weapons, and on agreeing without delay to a radical reduction in the armed forces and arms of the Warsaw Pact and NATO while securing strict mutual control. In this connection, the assessment particularly stresses that disarmament measures must safeguard equal security for all states, while completely respecting the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of each and every state in its existing borders, and must exclude the possibility of the application or threat of force.

The inclusion of tactical nuclear weapons in the negotiation process is becoming more and more urgent. The GDR has greeted the intention of the USSR to make further unilateral reductions in tactical nuclear missiles in Europe should the NATO states be prepared to negotiate. The Warsaw Pact states again offer parallel negotiations on these questions. The attitude toward the commencement of negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons is an indicator of whether the states and their alliances are really concerned about true disarmament, security, and trust between states with differing social orders. That is also true for the incorporation into the negotiation process of the naval forces stationed in European waters, concerning which the Warsaw Pact states also propose negotiations.

In a way which is rich in initiative, the GDR has helped shape the hopeful course of international affairs, with its predictable and constructive policy of dialogue, cooperation, and unilateral disarmament steps. As the other participant states of the Warsaw Pact do, it follows with concern the striving of influential forces in NATO for military superiority and compensation of achieved disarmament, as well as the increasing attempts at intervention in the internal affairs of the socialist states. The participants at the meeting therefore most emphatically stress that a common European house can only become reality when the existence with equal rights of states with different social orders, the prevailing territorial and political realities, the inviolability of the existing borders, and the sovereignty of all states are respected unconditionally, and any kind of subordination of other states is refrained from.

The allied socialist states pointed with emphasis to the peaceful settlement of regional conflicts and the urgent solution of such global problems as the preservation of the environment, overcoming underdevelopment, and shaping equal international economic relations. The GDR supports all realistic efforts to create a comprehensive system of ecological security in Europe, and for all European states to work out norms and principles binding under international law by 1992.

The SED Central Committee Politburo, the State Council, and the Council of Ministers of the GDR have decided the necessary measures to help realize the steps agreed at the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee in Bucharest to deepen the cooperation of the participant states in constructing socialism and to coordinate their steps to realize the joint peace and disarmament program.

Noncommunist Parties Express 'Full Agreement'
AU1807152689 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND
in German 15-16 Jul 89 p 1

[ADN report: "Full Agreement With Bucharest Results"]

[Text] Berlin—On behalf of Erich Honecker, Central Committee general secretary of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany [SED] and chairman of the GDR State Council, Joachim Herrmann, Politburo member and Central Committee secretary, briefed Guenther Maleuda, chairman of the Democratic Peasants Party of Germany [DBD]; Wolfgang Heyl, deputy chairman of the Christian Democratic Union of Germany [CDU]; Professor Manfred Gerlach, chairman of the Liberal Democratic Party of Germany [LDPD]; Professor Heinrich Homann, chairman of the National Democratic Party of Germany [NDPD]; and Professor Lothar Kolditz, president of the National Council of the GDR National Front, on the results of the Bucharest meeting of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee.

The representatives of the parties and the president of the National Front National Council expressed their satisfaction and full agreement with the documents adopted at the meeting that prove the allied socialist states' determination to consistently continue their policy of peace, disarmament, and cooperation. They said that the fact that the Bucharest meeting had restated that negotiations should be continued and results should be achieved on halving the strategic offensive weapons of the USSR and the United States, on reducing and banning nuclear tests, on banning and destroying chemical weapons, and on radically reducing conventional forces and arms, was in the interest of all GDR citizens. In this respect, it is particularly important that disarmament measures guarantee equal security for all states, while the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of each state within its existing borders must be strictly respected and the possibility of the use of force or the threat of force must be ruled out. The appeal to the NATO states to further the incipient change from confrontation to detente by disarmament measures of their own was marked by great political responsibility for international developments and was supported by all forces in the GDR's society, they said.

The DBD, CDU, LDPD, and NDPD representatives and the president of the National Front National Council stressed that the inclusion of tactical nuclear weapons in the negotiation process was becoming increasingly urgent. They welcomed the USSR's intention to start unilaterally reducing its tactical nuclear missiles in Europe, if NATO were to show the corresponding readiness for negotiations. The participants in the meeting stated their concern about the endeavors of influential forces within NATO to achieve military superiority and to compensate for weapons that have been removed under disarmament accords, and they expressed their concern about increasing attempts at interference in the socialist states' internal affairs. They stressed the statement made in the Bucharest documents that every nation determines its country's fate and has the right to chose its own social and economic system, as well as the type of state order that it considers suitable. They said that stability in Europe required the disclaiming of doctrines of confrontation and force, as well as the inadmissibility of any type of tutelage over other countries. Every attempt to call into question the European borders which are the result of World War II and postwar developments represents an attack on peace in Europe and replaces cooperation by confrontation. In this connection, all political and social forces in Europe are called upon to resolutely put an end to nationalist positions and the budding neo-Nazism in the FRG.

The chairmen of the parties that have friendly ties with the SED, and the president of the National Front National Council, asked Joachim Herrmann to convey to Erich Honecker their thanks for the work done in Bucharest under his chairmanship. They stressed that they would continue to use the possibilities they had to constructively help shape the policy of dialogue and cooperation.

In the course of the meeting, experiences were exchanged on the joint preparation for the GDR's 40th anniversary. It was stressed that the decisive thing continued to be the further strengthening of socialism on German soil for the people's benefit by their making their own contribution within the scope of the well-trying alliance between the parties. In this context, Joachim Herrmann passed on to the representatives of the friendly parties Erich Honecker's cordial thanks for the proposals and considerations submitted to him in preparation of the 12th SED Congress on further shaping the developed socialist society in the GDR, and particularly on continuing of the course of the unity of economic and social policy. He said that, as the eighth Central Committee meeting had corroborated, the SED considered comradely and trusting cooperation in the democratic bloc and in the National Front to be a basic component part of its social strategy and its daily political practice.

Editorial Assesses Warsaw Pact PCC Meeting in Bucharest

AU1207132389 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in German 11 Jul 89 p 2

[Unattributed editorial: "Warsaw Pact in Favor of a Europe of Security, Peace, Cooperation"]

[Text] The Warsaw Pact summit meeting at the weekend [7-8 July] called for making peace more secure and finding solutions to other major international problems. The Political Consultative Committee of its member states met in Bucharest at an important time: The transition from dangerous and senseless military confrontation to peaceful cooperation has proved to be possible; however, a basic change has not yet come about. In this situation everything must be done to make the process of disarmament continuous and irreversible.

In their statement "For a Stable and Secure Europe, Free from Nuclear and Chemical Weapons, for a Significant Reduction of Armed Forces, Arms, and Military Spending," the highest representatives of the allied states have stated what is now the task and what must now be done to strengthen peace, free mankind from the danger of war, and develop mutually advantageous cooperation.

Mankind is facing problems today that it must solve to ensure its survival and the progress of the civilization it has created. Overcoming underdevelopment, and protecting the environment on a global scale are examples of such big problems. To solve them, the active participation and common efforts of all countries, as well as the strengthening of the role of the United Nations are necessary.

These are the principles of such cooperation: safeguarding security by political, not military means; the primacy of international law in the relations between states; shaping normal relations, irrespective of the countries'

sociopolitical systems; renouncing hostility and confrontation in favor of political partnership, mutual understanding, confidence, and good-neighborliness; mutual consideration of the interests of all countries and peoples; and cooperation in the area of human rights.

Major opportunities offer themselves for cooperation in the economy, science, and technology, in the ecological and humanitarian areas. Removing the obstacles to and restrictions on trade and business relations, and implementing the civil, political, economic, social, and other rights and basic liberties of man within their interdependence are essential prerequisites in this respect. The spread of neofascism has given rise to particular concern.

The strict respect for the generally recognized norms of international law, for the principles and goals of the UN Charter and the Helsinki Final Act is indispensable. There is not just one standard for shaping society. Doctrines of confrontation and any interference in other countries' internal affairs must be disclaimed. No one can assume the role of judge or arbiter.

Based on all these principles, our alliance confirms its readiness to deepen the dialogue with all countries, and to cooperate with them to solve the tasks facing Europe and the world in a constructive way.

Discontinuing the arms race and disarmament is and remains the main task. Even though the two big alliances recognize the inadmissibility of another war, the level of military confrontation is still indefensibly high and dangerous. The fact that NATO adheres to the policy of strength and the strategy of deterrence is particularly alarming.

In harmony with the energetic activity of all peace-loving, realistically-minded forces in the world, the Warsaw Pact has set against this the concept of mutual and indivisible security. That means a military balance at the lowest possible level, which is only required for defense and rules out the possibility of a surprise attack and a large-scale offensive. Thus, armaments must be reduced to a level that totally eliminates the danger of war. The Soviet Union, the GDR, and other socialist states have already made unilateral concessions in the area of disarmament. They have called upon the NATO states to follow this example by taking adequate measures. It is not the military but the political factors of security and stability that must be strengthened.

Our alliance is ready to seek to achieve agreement on gradually and totally eliminating nuclear weapons, banning and destroying chemical weapons, radically reducing conventional forces, preventing the arms race in space, gradually reducing arms production, and considerably reducing military spending. All disarmament measures must include the most effective and the most

comprehensive verification. They guarantee equal security for all, while strictly respecting each country's sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity in the present borders, and ruling out the possibility of the use or threat of force.

What is particularly urgent is the conclusion of a treaty on a 50-percent reduction in the USSR and the U.S. strategic offensive weapons, while adhering to the ABM Treaty of 1972. Equally urgent is the discontinuance of all nuclear weapons tests. In addition, our alliance proposes separate negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons, the destabilizing effect of which would grow with conventional disarmament, and negotiations on the navies.

The Bucharest document describes the reduction of conventional forces, the reduction and subsequent elimination of tactical nuclear weapons, as well as the strengthening of confidence in Europe as crucial issues. As the next goal of the Vienna negotiations between the Warsaw Pact states and NATO it mentions the reaching of agreement on collective upper ceilings for troops and the most important weapon categories in Europe and individual European regions. It stresses that the additional proposals made at the NATO summit on conventional forces come closer to the Warsaw Pact positions. They should be formulated more precisely and should be put on the negotiating table before long, so that initial accords can be achieved soon—in the case of a constructive approach, as early as 1990.

At the Vienna negotiations of the 35 CSCE states, new security and confidence-building measures should be adopted, including the expansion of the Stockholm agreement on the announcement, observation, and restriction of all military activities, including those of the air forces and navies. A center on reducing the danger of war and preventing surprise attacks should be set up. A meeting of the highest representatives of the CSCE states should be called to discuss the results achieved and lay down tasks reaching into the future.

The participants in the Bucharest meeting informed each other about their countries' internal developments. As the communique says, in doing so they stressed the vitality of the ideas of socialism, the significance of perfecting and renewing socialist society, and the dynamism of the political and economic systems. Socialist construction is defined as a creative process which is based on general principles and laws, as well as on the experiences of mankind, while developing differently in the individual countries in line with their conditions, traditions, and requirements. Their mutual relations are based on equality and independence. Every country has the right to work out and implement its own political line, strategy, and tactics, without any outside interference.

The summit has made it clear once again that the Warsaw Pact reliably guarantees security for all. It is an important factor of peace and stability. By strengthening

their solidarity and deepening cooperation, through their constructive individual and collective actions, the member states will continue to exert a favorable influence on international processes. That is the message of Bucharest.

Honecker Letter to GDR Section of IPPNW
AU1407101589 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND
in German 13 Jul 89 p 1

[ADN report: "Erich Honecker Letter to GDR Section of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War—GDR Resolutely in Favor of Elimination of Nuclear Weapons"]

[Text] Berlin—Erich Honecker, Central Committee general secretary of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and chairman of the GDR State Council, has replied to a joint appeal by the GDR and FRG sections of the organization, International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW), against the modernization of short-range nuclear weapons early in July. The letter to the GDR section reads as follows:

Dear Professor Mebel:
Dear Professor Roeding:

I have noticed with attention your letter of 8 May 1989 in which you, as representatives of the FRG and GDR sections of IPPNW, loyal to the physicians' ethics, appeal to responsible politicians in the GDR and FRG to prevent the modernization of short-range nuclear missiles.

As you know, the GDR resolutely works for the elimination of all nuclear weapons from the European continent and even the entire planet. In order to achieve this goal, there must be no break in the incipient disarmament process which also includes further zero solutions for nuclear weapons.

In this respect, the GDR Government and all social forces of our country are fully in agreement with the public in West Europe, including the FRG. We share your assessment of the dangers that have been created by influential NATO forces under the pretext of modernizing tactical nuclear weapons—dangers to the process of disarmament and confidence-building, and dangers to our joint efforts to build a peaceful common European home.

As physicians, you rightly point out the inconceivable consequences that the use of short-range nuclear missiles or theater weapons would have for people's life and health, and for the existence of civilization in Europe in general, and the two German states in particular. This was also stressed in the Potsdam declaration that was recently adopted by your colleagues, the representatives of the European sections of IPPNW.

The GDR proposes holding negotiations as soon as possible on the reduction and finally total elimination of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, without any inhibiting precondition or linkage with other disarmament issues.

The statement of the Warsaw Pact foreign ministers on tactical nuclear weapons and the more far-reaching initiatives of our alliance offer a constructive basis for this. The position that NATO has adopted on this issue recently may prove to be another constructive element, if the relevant political will exists. I may assure you that the GDR will do everything in its power to make its contribution, and in doing so it will always also take into account the remarkable commitment of the physicians that are united in the IPPNW, and the commitment of the international peace movement.

Yours very sincerely,

E. Honecker

Envoy to CD Stresses Need for 'Checks' on Chemical Weapons Ban

Addresses Plenary Session

AU1707193289 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND
in German 14 Jul 89 p 5

[ADN report: "Geneva—Offers for Verification of Chemical Disarmament"]

[Excerpt] Geneva—In his speech at the plenary session of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament [CD], GDR Ambassador Peter Dietze stressed that the GDR holds the view that observance of the chemical weapons ban must also be guaranteed by checks when there is suspicion. He said that to this end, the conference must agree on the right to request on-site inspections at any place and at any time. He said that the GDR was convinced that understanding could be reached in the time that is left for the conference if all sides show the respective willingness and readiness. He said that the GDR delegation would make an active contribution in the sense of the Warsaw Pact's recent statement so that the summer session can be concluded with favorable negotiation results. [passage omitted]

Confers With CSSR, FRG CD Envoys

AU1107184889 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND
in German 8-9 Jul 89 p 5

[ADN report: "Exchange of Opinions on Chemical Disarmament in Geneva"]

[Text] Geneva (ADN)—The heads of the GDR, CSSR, and FRG delegations to the Geneva Conference on Disarmament [CD], Dr Peter Dietz, Vratislav Vajnar, and Dr Paul Joachim von Stuelpnagel, met for a further

talk on aspects of chemical disarmament in Geneva on Friday [7 July]. They concurrently pointed out the urgency of a global chemical weapons ban.

The diplomats discussed experiences from the national test inspections to build confidence and to examine the control regulations of the chemical-weapons ban contained in the draft convention and the question of multilateral experiments in this field. Referring to their countries' proposals to create a chemical-weapons-free zone in Europe, Ambassador Dr Dietze and his CSSR colleague Vajnar stressed that confidence-building measures on a regional scale would promote a worldwide chemical-weapons ban. The ambassadors agreed to continue their talks.

SED, SPD Deliberate European Security Issues

CFE/CSBM, SNF, CW Discussed

LD1407211489 East Berlin ADN International Service
in German 1545 GMT 14 Jul 89

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—Today in Berlin the joint working group of the SED [Socialist Unity Party of Germany] Central Committee and SPD [Social Democratic Party of Germany] Bundestag group on European security questions continued its work in a 10th meeting. It further deliberated issues of nonaggression capability and sufficient defense.

The working group expressed the hope that after a successful start the Vienna negotiations on European conventional disarmament and confidence- and security-building measures will make speedy and constructive progress. It will promote this development through its own proposals. At the same time the working group is of the opinion that stability, security, and nonaggression capability in Europe cannot be achieved completely and reliably as long as tactical nuclear weapons remain on European territory. Therefore, the working group affirmed the SED and SPD's demand for the earliest possible start to negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons in Europe in parallel with the Vienna negotiations on conventional armed forces. In pursuing this objective and fleshing out the agreement concluded between Erich Honecker, general secretary of the SED Central Committee and chairman of the GDR Council of State, and Dr Hans-Jochen Vogel, chairman of the SPD and of the SPD Bundestag group, in Berlin on 25 May 1989 the working group conducted an initial exchange of views to work out a proposal on the reduction and gradual elimination of tactical nuclear weapons. The joint working group noted that its proposals for the creation of a chemical weapons free zone, a nuclear-free corridor, as well as a zone of confidence and security in Central Europe are gaining in topicality.

The working group welcomed the proposals for a stable and secure Europe contained in the latest statement by the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw

pact states. It likewise welcomed NATO's proposals for including troop strength and air forces in the Vienna negotiations. Both sides should reply constructively to these proposals.

The working group paid attention to Mikhail Gorbachev's proposal made before the Council of Europe in Strasbourg to carry out meetings of experts by those states that maintain nuclear weapons in Europe together with states on whose territories such weapons are stationed. The objective of such talks would be to clear up confusion and mistrust, in order to find a common way toward the gradual reduction of the nuclear weapons potentials.

The working group agreed to hold its next meeting in Bonn on 12 October 1989.

The meeting was attended by: For the SED—Hermann Axen, Politburo member and secretary of the Central Committee; Professor Dr Joachim Boehm, deputy department head of the Central Committee; Prof Dr Manfred Mueller, head of the fundamental issues department of the International Relations Institute Postdam-Babelsberg; Dr Guenter Hillmann, section head at the Foreign Ministry; Naval Captain Manfred Graczynski, staff member of the Defense Ministry; and Karl-Heinz Wagner, Central Committee staff member. For the SPD—Egon Bahr, chairman of the subcommittee for disarmament and arms control in the German Bundestag and member of the SPD Presidium; Karsten D. Voigt, chairman of the chemical disarmament working group and representative of the SPD Bundestag group of the Foreign Affairs Committee and member of the SPD party executive; Erwin Horn, representative of the SPD Bundestag group in the Defense Committee; Dr Hermann Scheer, representative of the disarmament and arms control working group of the SPD Bundestag group and member of the SPD Party Council; and Dr Uwe Stehr, expert of the SPD Bundestag group.

To Propose SNF Cuts, Elimination

*AU1407185189 Hamburg DPA in German
1627 GMT 14 Jul 89*

[Text] Bonn/East-Berlin (DPA)—On Friday [14 July] the joint working group on questions of security policy formed by the Bundestag group of the Social Democratic Party of Germany [SPD] and the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany [SED] has started to prepare a proposal on the reduction and step-by-step elimination of tactical nuclear weapons [SNF]. According to a press release by the SPD group in Bonn this evening, a first exchange of views has taken place.

The working group affirmed the SPD and SED's call for starting as soon as possible negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Europe parallel to the Vienna negotiations on conventional armed forces. Stability, security, and inability to attack cannot be achieved completely and reliably in Europe as long as

such systems remain deployed on European soil. The next session of the working group, members of which are, among others, SPD disarmament expert Egon Bahr and SED Politburo member Hermann Axen, is scheduled to take place in Bonn on 12 October.

NATO Reluctance About Disarmament Criticized *AU1907073289 East Berlin BERLINER ZEITUNG in German 17 Jul 89 p 2*

[Wolfgang Georgi commentary: "NATO and Nuclear Disarmament"]

[Text] By accepting the U.S. proposal to carry out test inspections for the verification of strategic nuclear weapons before a treaty for their reduction is signed, the Soviet Union has once again proved its flexibility concerning questions of nuclear disarmament. At the same time, this move has probably overcome an obstacle at the Geneva negotiations on halving strategic offensive weapons, since the United States made the result dependent on the issue of verification.

Already at the Reykjavik summit in October 1986 a basic agreement between the USSR and the United States on the need for such a reduction was achieved. It would comprise land-based missiles with a range of more than 5,500 km, submarine-based longer-range missiles, and long-distance bombers, that is, weapons systems, which constitute nine-tenths of the two states' destructive nuclear potential. Halving this potential would mean making life on earth safer.

This goal is served by a number of proposals submitted to NATO by the Warsaw Pact states. They range from Mikhail Gorbachev's detailed plan to completely free the world from nuclear weapons by the year 2000 to negotiations on the radical reduction of conventional armed forces in Europe, to the suggestion to discuss the military doctrines of the two camps in a new spirit that would promote peace. The seriousness of these offers has been underpinned by numerous unilateral advance moves.

Regardless of the will of their peoples, influential NATO circles continue to adhere to their policy of strength and the strategy of nuclear deterrence—as can be seen from recent statements. The most important component in this respect are the U.S. nuclear weapons in Western Europe. In particular the short-range missiles deployed in the FRG are to be brought up to a range of slightly below 500 km through "modernization."

Obviously, NATO intends to preserve at all costs—and be it at the cost of destroying mankind—its nuclear first-strike ability and its ability to wage a nuclear war of aggression. Therefore, NATO Secretary General Woerner is not willing to consider "under any circumstances" the prospect of a Europe without nuclear weapons and therefore a third zero-option is categorically rejected.

Therefore, NATO also refuses to conduct negotiations on the reduction of tactical nuclear weapons parallel to the Vienna talks on conventional armed forces and armaments. It wants to discuss this issue only after results have been achieved in Vienna. Warsaw Pact proposals for radical conventional disarmament have been on the table there for months—NATO has promised a response to these proposals for “autumn at the earliest.” Experience shows that a response does not itself constitute a solution, but it is a precondition for finding a solution. And those who delay fulfilling this precondition must accept being asked whether they are seriously interested in a solution. It remains to be seen whether the NATO proposal, which has now been presented in Vienna, is conducive to advancing the negotiations.

The Soviet-U.S. treaty of December 1987 on the elimination of intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) in Europe proved that substantive progress is possible on the path of nuclear disarmament whatever profound differences there might be. It was a first step toward a world without a nuclear threat—it is high time for other steps to follow. Because “the elimination of the danger of a nuclear and conventional war and the consolidation of international security are objectively necessary preconditions for the survival and progress of mankind,” as the Bucharest statement of the Warsaw Pact states says. “Proceeding from this, the Warsaw Pact states consider the halting of the arms race and disarmament to be the main task of the present.”

Commentary Assails B-2 as ‘Offensive, First-Strike’ Weapon

LD1907125489 East Berlin Voice of GDR Domestic Service in German 0906 GMT 18 Jul 89

[Wolfgang Grosse commentary]

[Excerpts] The Stealth bomber is the most expensive aircraft in the world. While as yet there is no indication to the final outlays, estimates range from \$500-750 million per aircraft. The Pentagon plans to order a total of 132 stealth bombers by the mid-1990's. [passage omitted] Given its enormous costs, the project has been highly controversial in the U.S. Congress. However, criticism is not confined to the project's financial aspects.

With a 12-16,000-km reach and a payload of 25 tons of nuclear or conventional weapons, the so-called Stealth bomber—and here lies the rub—owes its name to the capacity of entering foreign space unnoticed and beyond the reach of enemy surveillance. It is certainly not the type of aircraft required for border protection or defense purposes. The new U.S. strategic bomber quite obviously is an offensive weapon, a first-strike instrument designed to catch the enemy unaware and leave no time for reprisals. That is the crucial idea underlying the criticism of the new U.S. miracle weapon.

The Stealth bomber is too sophisticated to be in line with current requirements. After all, were the Warsaw Pact and NATO not set to start arms reduction talks including those on air forces in September of this year? What about the talks under way on various levels in Vienna, Geneva, and elsewhere, designed to build confidence, render international relations more reliable and stable, and reduce existing risks? Is the Warsaw Pact not restructuring its forces to bring them more into line with its defensive character? Only yesterday the Soviet Union withdrew 30 SU-24-type bombers from GDR territory to replace them by MIG-27 interceptors. The news of the Stealth test flight on the one hand and the removal of Soviet bombers on the other represents diametrically opposed military concepts, namely old and new thinking in international politics.

HUNGARY

Comparison of Hungarian, Soviet Press Versions of Warsaw Pact Documents

PCC Communiqué

AU1307141489

[Editorial Report] Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian on 10 July on pages 1 and 2 carries a 2,500-word unattributed communiqué on the meeting of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee [PCC] held in Bucharest on 8 July, under the headline: “The All-European Process Should Develop in All Areas, the Communiqué Stresses.”

Comparison of the MAGYAR NEMZET version with the Moscow PRAVDA item headlined “Communiqué Published” in the JPRS Report: ARMS CONTROL for 19 July 1989, JPRS-TAC-89-029, page 12, column 1, shows the two to be identical, except for the addition of subheads and for the following variations:

Page 12, first paragraph, first sentence to sentence two reads: [Text] The communiqué issued on the 2-day meeting sums up the principles formulated by the participants and the thought of renewing the organization. Taking part in.... (substituting opening passage)

Page 13, column one, fourth paragraph, first sentence to fifth paragraph, first sentence reads: ...cutting conventional weapons. [new graf] The Warsaw Pact.... (deleting passage)

Document Urging Arms Cuts Adopted

AU1407100289

[Editorial Report] Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian on 10 July on pages 2 and 3 carries a 2,500-word statement of the Warsaw Pact member states, under the headline: “Statement of the Warsaw Pact Member States—We Should Achieve New Disarmament Agreements.”

Comparison of the MAGYAR NEMZET version with the Moscow PRAVDA item headlined "Document Urging Arms Cuts Adopted" published in the JPRS Report: ARMS CONTROL for 19 July 1989, JPRS-TAC-89-029, page 7, column 2, shows the two to be identical, except for the addition of subheads, and for the following variations:

Page 8, column one, paragraph four, line fifteen reads: ...to race, sex and religion or nationality.... (deleting word "language")

Page 9, column one, fourth paragraph, last sentence to column two, first paragraph, sentence one reads: ...an important task.

Those taking part in the conference see as an immediate.... (omitting two paragraphs)

Page 10, column one, last paragraph, last sentence to column two, second paragraph, sentence one reads: ...strengthening mutual trust.

It was emphasized.... (omitting one paragraph)

Page 11, column one, paragraph one, sentence one to second paragraph, sentence one reads: ...every possible way.

The states represented.... (omitting passage)

The MAGYAR NEMZET version ends after paragraph 48, omitting last paragraph and signatories.

POLAND

Official Assessments of Warsaw Pact PCC Meeting in Bucharest

Politburo Discussion

AU2007152989 Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish
14 Jul 89 pp 1-2

[PAP headline: "Communique Issued Following Meeting of the PZPR Central Committee Politburo"]

[Excerpts] On 12 July the Polish United Workers Party [PZPR] Central Committee Politburo assessed the socio-political and economic situation in the country. [passage omitted]

The Politburo was briefed on the course and results of the conference of the Political Consultative Committee [PCC] of Warsaw Pact member states that was held in Bucharest from 7 through 8 July.

The Politburo emphasized the great importance of the conference, which took place at a time when "new thinking," arms control processes, and the strengthening of security and confidence are entering a qualitatively new stage.

One of the chief goals at the present time is the attainment of progress in the Vienna negotiations on conventional forces and the commencement of negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. This enhances the importance of the USSR's readiness to implement further unilateral reductions in tactical nuclear missiles if the NATO states are prepared to hold negotiations on these weapons.

The Politburo stated with satisfaction that the conference documents accord first-rank importance to the development of the pan-European process and the creation of a single Europe of lasting peace and cooperation, while respecting political and territorial realities and the inviolability of existing borders.

Support was expressed for the allied states' proposals concerning the establishment of a constructive dialogue between the Warsaw Pact and NATO on political and military matters. It would represent an important contribution to stability and security on our continent. [passage omitted]

Council of Ministers' Discussion

LD1807003689 Warsaw PAP in English
0008 GMT 17 Jul 89

[Excerpt] Warsaw, July 17—The government holding its debate today under chairmanship of Premier Mieczyslaw Rakowski acquainted itself with the results of the debate of the advisory Political Committee of states-parties to the Warsaw Treaty held in Bucharest July 7-8. The government assessed that the settlements made in Bucharest would favour the deepening of the well-developing East-West dialogue and the strengthening of detente tendencies in Europe. Results of the debate create favourable conditions for implementation of Polish foreign policy, the gathered emphasized. [passage omitted]

Commentary Hails 'Multilateral Approach' of Pact PCC Meeting

AU1807163989 Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish
11 Jul 89 p 7

[Ryszard Drecki commentary: "Continuing Offer of Dialogue and Cooperation"]

[Text] The communique and the statement "For a Stable, Secure Europe, Free From Nuclear and Chemical Weapons: For a Real Reduction of Armed Forces, Arms, and Military Expenditure" are two documents which are the fruit of the Bucharest deliberations of the Political Consultative Committee [PCC] of the Warsaw Pact member states. What is striking about these two documents is their breadth and the multilateral approach to the subject, coupled with the depth of the analysis of the problems. Not one of the important European and world issues has been omitted.

This multilateral quality, coupled with the decision made in Bucharest "to politically strengthen the nature of the Warsaw Pact and democratically perfect the mechanisms of cooperation in its framework" confirms the changes which have been evident for some time now in the way the socialist coalition has been functioning. The political function of the Warsaw Pact has been increasingly stressed, a pact which is clearly emerging as a political platform of cooperation between the member states; a pact which is not just a military, defensive alliance, but one that is becoming a mechanism for the joint tasks which emerge in the course of the development of international life.

Among the tasks which the Bucharest documents highlight is the problem concerned with disarmament, an element which accords with the present policy of the socialist countries. This thinking can be summarized in the following way: The aim is to achieve a decisive breakthrough in the sphere of disarmament which, in spite of definite progress, has not occurred. This breakthrough should lead to the preservation of a military balance on a minimum level, which would be sufficient for defense, but would preclude the capacity for sudden aggression or offensive action on a large scale. This would minimize the danger of war.

Among the immediate short-range tasks, the allied countries meeting in Bucharest have stressed the necessity of speeding up work on a convention that would completely ban chemical weapons, radically reduce conventional forces, and solve the question of nuclear weapons in Europe. Especially interesting is the suggestion to create an actual advisory-information center to reduce the danger of war and sudden aggression in Europe. There is talk of calling the leaders of the 35 CSCE countries to a conference devoted to disarmament and security.

The importance of joint or individual disarmament efforts of a more regional nature was confirmed. The Jaruzelski Plan belongs to this category of initiatives, having as its aim disarmament and increased trust in central Europe.

Giving priority to disarmament affairs in the building of a lasting European peace, the Political Consultative Committee has also expressed a general view on the development of other forms of cooperation in other European spheres, namely, economic, scientific, technical, protection of the environment, humanitarian relations, personal contacts, culture, education, and human rights....

The two documents strongly stress that the creation of the common European home requires the acceptance of the prevailing territorial and political realities, the inviolability of boundaries, and the sovereignty of states. "The participants" we read, among other things, "have stressed the necessity to reject all forms of revanchism

and chauvinism, all forms of antagonism between nations. This fact is important at a time there are voices in the FRG proclaiming that "the Third Reich still exists in its 1937 boundaries."

The documents from Bucharest crystallize the current socialist thinking on the various tasks and aims to preserve the positive transformations in international relations, to build peace in Europe, and represent a continuing offer of dialogue and cooperation which the Warsaw Pact countries have always advocated. The Bucharest conference reaffirms the role of the Warsaw Pact as a structure which links a continuing anxiety for the security of its member states with the function of a more active factor in the development of cooperation between East and West, and specially on the European arena.

Delegation Chief on Significance for Poland of Vienna CFE/CSBM Talks

*LD1407085189 Warsaw PAP in English
2142 GMT 13 Jul 89*

[By PAP correspondent Andrzej Rayzacher]

[Text] Vienna, July 13—Representative of Poland, Ambassador Włodzimierz Konarski who leads the Polish delegation at the Vienna CSCE disarmament negotiations which started in March 1989, told PAP after the second round of the negotiations about affects that the Vienna talks might have for Poland. Excerpts:

The negotiations are of historic significance for Europe and, consequently, for Poland. A radical diminishing of military threat on our continent in the field of conventional weapons is becoming possible. This should pave the way for the progress of nuclear disarmament.

The Vienna agreement will specify admissible levels for military alliances and for each particular country concerning the negotiated categories of weapons and number of armed forces. Thus, the negotiations will result in a new dimension of defences of particular countries at a much lower level than the present one.

I guess there is no need to persuade anybody how important that is for us from the point of view of Poland's security and economic consequences of such an agreement. A new extended system of confidence building measures will be established which will regulate military activities in times of peace.

These agreements in the military-political field will create a solid foundation for a common European home, therefore success of the Vienna CSCE negotiations lies also in the well-understood national interest of Poland.

ROMANIA

Party Endorses Results of Warsaw Pact Summit *AU1407185689 Bucharest AGERPRES in English* 1757 GMT 14 Jul 89

["Approval of the Results and Documents of the Bucharest Meeting"—AGERPRES headline]

[Text] Bucharest, AGERPRES 14/7/1989—During the meeting of the Executive Political Committee of the CC [Central Committee] of the RCP [Romanian Communist Party] of 14 July, an account was read of the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty states held in Bucharest on 7 and 8 July 1989.

The Executive Political Committee was highly appreciative of the activity carried out by the general secretary of the party, president of the republic, Nicolae Ceausescu, at the meeting and during the interview of the communist and workers' party leaders of the socialist countries participant in the Warsaw Treaty, as well as of the way in which he set forth Romania's position on the questions discussed, highlighting that that corresponded to the orientations set by the 13th Congress and the National Conference of the RCP, to the interests and aspirations of the Romanian people, the general cause of socialism and peace worldwide.

It was stressed that, owing to the special importance of the questions discussed and of the decisions made, the Bucharest meeting was a moment of utmost significance for the future collaboration between the Warsaw Treaty states both internationally and in the socialist construction.

The Executive Political Committee underscored the significance of the documents signed and adopted on the occasion, which mirror the common positions of all the participants in the meeting, and evince the determination of the Warsaw Treaty socialist countries to take firm action for the achievement of disarmament, nuclear disarmament first and foremost, for the ensurance of peace in Europe and the world over. The significance was underlined in this respect of the document "For a Stable and Secured Europe, Free From Nuclear and Chemical Weapons, for a Substantial Reduction of Armed Forces, Armaments and Military Spending" signed in Bucharest.

It was assessed that, owing to their content, the declaration and the communique of the meeting were an appeal to all the NATO countries, to other states of the world to take concerted action for the assertion of the new policy of peace and collaboration, of full equality of rights apt to ensure the free and independent development of all nations.

It was pointed out that special attention was given during the meeting to the further improvement of the activity of the treaty's Political Consultative Committee, to the

accentuation of its political character for a growing collaboration and mutual consultations in fundamental questions of the socialist construction in each country.

The Executive Political Committee reiterated Romania's will to expand and consolidate collaboration with all socialist countries in the building of the new system, on the basis of observance of the right of each state, of each party to self-reliantly make its political line, revolutionary tactics and strategy by applying the general laws of scientific socialism to the specific conditions in each country.

Approving of the results of the Bucharest meeting, of its documents and decisions, the Executive Political Committee reasserted Romania's determination to take further action, in close unity with the other socialist states, with the peoples and advanced forces everywhere for the achievement of disarmament, the elimination of the war threat, the political, negotiated settlement of the states of tension and conflict, of all the interstate litigious issues, for the building of a united Europe of free and independent countries, for the establishment of a climate of peace, understanding and broad cooperation on this continent and throughout the world.

Theses for 14th Communist Party Congress Published

AU1307090689 Bucharest SCINTEIA in Romanian
5 Jul 89 pp 1-4

["Theses of the 14th RCP Congress on the Development of Romanian Society, the Improvement of Socioeconomic Management, the Development of Workers Revolutionary Democracy, the Enhancement of the Role of the Romanian Communist Party, the Intensification of the Ideological, Political-Education Activity, the Improvement of the Level of Scientific and Cultural Knowledge and of Revolutionary Awareness, and the Balance of Forces and the Basic Characteristic of the International Situation"]

[Excerpts] The 14th Congress of the Romanian Communist Party [RCP] is an event of historical significance in our country's socioeconomic activity and in the activity of our party and people.

Taking place in the year of the 45th anniversary of the antifascist and anti-imperialist revolution for social and national liberation, the congress will be an opportunity for a profound and comprehensive assessment of the road traveled by the Romanian people in socialist construction, particularly after the Ninth RCP Congress, and of the activity carried out to implement the decisions of the 13th RCP Congress and National Conference; it will examine the current stage of Romanian society and will set forth the goals and guidelines for Romania's development in the 1991-95 period, and up to the years 2000-10. Through the decisions it will adopt, the congress will go down in history as the congress of great socialist victories, of the triumph of the principles

of scientific socialism in the revolutionary transformation of Romanian society, and of Romania's genuine sovereignty and complete economic and political independence.

The 14th RCP Congress theses will be an opportunity for the Communists and working people to broadly discuss the basic problems of socialist construction in our homeland and will ensure the formulation, in a democratic way, of the general line and long-term guidelines for our country's development. Thus the decisions that are to be adopted by the congress will reflect the aspirations and will of the entire party and people. [passage omitted]

XVIII. The Basic Characteristics of the International Situation. Romania's Foreign Policy of Peace, Cooperation, and Active Participation in Finding Constructive Solutions to the Great Problems of Our Times

The entire evolution of the international political situation completely confirms the correctness and realistic nature of the Romanian foreign policy and of Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu's conclusions and recommendations regarding the new tendencies that occur in the international arena and the ways and means to solve the complex problems of our times.

In international life, we witness the manifestations of the two major tendencies, which are represented, on one hand, by the forces of progress and peace and, on the other hand, by the imperialist and reactionary forces. The financial-banking capital, the great monopolies, and transnational societies have become the main form of the imperialist and neocolonialist policy of domination and oppression and of the policy of violation of the independence and sovereignty of nations.

It has been proved in reality that a relative equilibrium in the balance of forces has been achieved, which has enabled the world to overcome some very difficult moments and to ensure peace in the world for almost 45 years.

The international crisis is expanding and the economic and political instability is increasing.

The international situation has greatly worsened as a result of the fact that in spite of the good-will declarations the arms race continues.

The steps taken in past years—particularly as a result of the agreement reached between the Soviet Union and the United States of America on the elimination of intermediate and short-range missiles—have not led to radical changes in the course of the international situation.

The struggle for disarmament and peace continues to be the fundamental issue for the present and the future of mankind. As long as nuclear weapons are not eliminated, the danger of a nuclear war that could lead to the destruction of the whole of mankind will persist. Romania believes that the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, the elimination of chemical weapons, and the radical reduction of conventional weapons is the surest way to ensure the survival of mankind and the condition for preserving life on our planet! It is necessary to completely eliminate the concept of ensuring peace through "nuclear deterrence", which, as a matter of fact, means a policy of force and domination.

In the field of disarmament, a great responsibility lies with the European countries and the Warsaw Pact and NATO-member countries. At the same time, taking into consideration the fact that the military blocks have become anachronistic and do not offer any guarantee or security, everything necessary has to be done to ensure their simultaneous dismantlement.

Romania actively militates for a united Europe of cooperation and peace, based on strict respect for the diversity of social systems and the freedom and independence of each nation. Our country is not and will never be in favor of a Europe in which the independence of peoples and nations is crushed, regardless of the way in which this is done!

Romania will continue to work most consistently to develop cooperation in the Balkans and to turn this region into a zone of peace and good neighborliness, free of nuclear and chemical weapons, and free of foreign military bases. Likewise, our country supports the achievement of such zones in the central and northern part of Europe, as well as on other continents.

Romania will continue to militate for the elimination of force and the threat of force from interstate relations and for negotiated solutions, through political and peaceful means, to all problems. [passage omitted]

BRAZIL

**Negotiations With France To Buy Ariane Rocket
Engine Technology**

*LD1707142889 Paris Domestic Service in French
1300 GMT 17 Jul 89*

[Text] The company Arianespace, which markets the European launcher Ariane on the world market, confirmed in Paris today that it is currently negotiating the

launching of two Brazilian satellites and that, within this framework, a transfer of technology of the Viking engine, with which the first stage of the rocket is equipped, to Brazil is envisaged. This agreement is under negotiation and will be submitted to the relevant authorities shortly, a spokesperson for Arianespace specified.

IRAN

Treaty on Chemical Weapons Ban Urged at Geneva Disarmament Conference

*LD0407213589 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian
1630 GMT 4 Jul 89*

[Text] Mr Velayati, our country's foreign minister, today at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament pointed to Iraqi use of chemical weapons during the war against Iran. He further sought the formation of a treaty aimed at imposing a ban on the production, storage and use of chemical weapons.

Mr Velayati then described the history of Iraqi use of chemical weapons and said: Between 1981-88, Iraq extensively used chemical weapons in the war against Iran. Our country's foreign minister stressed that the disarmament conference must reach a speedy agreement pertaining to the total and absolute destruction of such weapons.

Referring to the peace negotiations between Iran and Iraq, Mr Velayati emphasized that the UN Security Council should put Iraq under pressure to evacuate approximately 3,000 square km of Iran's occupied land. The foreign minister of our country added: The withdrawal of Iraqi forces to international borders will pave the way for the countinuation of peace negotiations which are facing a deadlock.

He then considered the attack on Iranian passenger airbus by the U.S. warship as one of the results of the foreign countries' military expeditions to the Persian Gulf. He further sought those forces' withdrawal.

IRAQ

Envoy Addresses Geneva UN Disarmament Conference

*JN1307180889 Baghdad INA in English
1615 GMT 13 Jul 89*

[Text] Geneva, July 13, INA—Iraq warned the international community against the possession by the Zionist entity of nuclear weapons and long-range missiles. Iraq also noted the comprehensive efforts exerted by the Iranian regime to buy arms including chemical weapons through all means including the illegal ones.

That was stated in a speech delivered by Mr Barzan Ibrahim, Iraq's permanent representative at the U.N. European Headquarters in Geneva today before the second session of Disarmament Conference which started here on June 13 last.

Iraq's representative called on the international community to take effective and appropriate measures to get rid of nuclear weapons and all destructive weapons from the Middle East region recalling the Israeli aggression

against the peaceful Iraqi nuclear plant in June [1981] and the report of the U.N. secretary general concerning Iran's use of chemical weapons in its war against Iraq.

In his speech he stressed the importance of reinforcing the security of the non-nuclear countries in certain regions in the world particularly the Middle East region in the light of the Zionist entity's possessing nuclear and chemical weapons.

He declared Iraq's support and backing to the project submitted by Peru to the conference concerning preventing the attacks on nuclear centers. He said that the effects of such an aggression could not be confined only to the targeted country but they would also be comprehensive and the target would be man everywhere.

He referred in this respect to Iraq's firm attitude vis-a-vis the 1945 Geneva protocol and its continuous support for the international efforts in the field of disarmament reminding the conference that Iraq was among the first countries who joined the international treaties and conventions in this field.

The representative of Iraq decisively replied to the attack of the Iranian foreign minister in his speech before the conference last week. Iraq's representative said that the Iranian regime's representative attempted to exploit the conference for propaganda purposes and to drag it to matters out of its specializations harming by doing so its credibility as an authority upon which [the] world pins hopes to realize important achievements in disarmament.

He said that the Iranian regime through raising the issue of implementing the U.N. Security Council Resolution No. 598 before a committee which is not responsible to solve regional conflicts and not authorized to implement the Security Council resolution wanted to deviate from its responsibilities to carry out the Resolution No. 598 and to deviate from implementing the agreement of 8th August 1988 concerning ceasefire that obliged the two parties to enter into direct negotiations under the auspices of the U.N. secretary general to reach a joint understanding of all other provisions of the resolution and the measures and timings required for that.

The Iraqi representative said in his speech that the Iranian foreign minister who complained before the conference for the failure of realizing any progress in implementing the Resolution No. 598 was himself who rejected, up to this day, to abide [as received] by the direct negotiations and insisted on the selective trend in implementing the resolution so that his government would not be committed to anything.

He said if the Iranian foreign minister believed in the obligation of the Resolution No. 598, did he forget how his country had rejected the resolution for a full year after its endorsement by the Security Council and actually after the deterioration of its military front?

Iraq's representative informed the conference about the comprehensive efforts exerted by Iran to buy weapons including chemical weapons through all means including the illegal ones.

He said that the international information media were still covering the scandals of the Iranian regime in smuggling chemical materials the most recent of which were those materials smuggled from a European country and were confiscated in an Arab Gulf port. Then the European country was forced to expel the Iranian diplomats involved in the smuggling operation.

The Iraqi representative added that the speech of the Iranian regime's foreign minister did not reflect a political will in the favour of peace and did not reflect a sincere intention to establish it while efforts are exerted to realize peace.

The Iraqi representative called at the conclusion of his speech on the Iranian regime's foreign minister to abide by logic and the international relations and the modern society and to depart from the policy of deviation, cheating and cunning in order to achieve security, stability, peace and progress in the region and all its peoples.

The conference is scheduled to conclude its second session on August 31 next after discussing many major issues related to disarmament the most important among which are banning nuclear tests, stopping nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament as well as [passage indistinct].

The conference had started its first session of this year on 7th February and continued till 27th April last.

Reduced Numbers To Be Involved in Exercises in GDR, Hungary

18010855z Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA (First Edition) in Russian 23 Jul 89 p 3

[TASS headline: "In the USSR Ministry of Defense"]

[Text] In conformity with a decision of the Soviet Government on the reduction of the USSR Armed Forces, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territories of the GDR and the Hungarian Peoples' Republic to the Soviet Union is being fulfilled.

Simultaneously, a series of organizational measures concerned with giving to formations and units a new structure, corresponding to the demands of the defensive character of Soviet military doctrine, is being carried out among the troops.

In connection with this in the plan for USSR military activities subject to notification during 1989, changes and a reduced general number of personnel participating in notifiable military exercises are being introduced:

—in exercises on the territory of the GDR in September, instead of 25,000 men, less than 13,000 men and less than 300 tanks will operate;

—in the exercise on the territory of the Hungarian People's Republic in October instead of 13,000 men, up to 11,000 men will be turned out;

—in exercises of the Airborne Forces on the territory of the Baltic Military District in September instead of 16,500 men, it is planned to involve around 13,000 men.

Reports concerning changes in the plan of notifiable USSR military activities will be directed to all member states of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe on a timely basis.

'Social Group' Monitors Troop Withdrawals From Eastern Europe

LD1807161689 Warsaw PAP in English
1508 GMT 18 Jul 89

[Text] Warsaw, July 18—"A Soviet independent battalion of trucks and a training regiment of tanks have already been pulled out from Poland. We know for sure that a regiment of anti-aircraft rockets, a regiment of helicopters, and an independent battalion of chemical defence are also envisaged for pullout," Sergey Rogov, the head of the Department for Military Affairs of the Institute of the U.S. and Canada of the Soviet Academy of Sciences who is also a deputy chairman of the Social Group for Control of the Reduction of the Soviet Army told a reporter of the GAZETA LUBUSKA daily issued in Zielona Gora.

"A few members of our group have arrived in Poland," Rogov elaborated, "to examine the process of withdrawing some units of the Northern Group of Troops of the Soviet Army back to the territory of the USSR. It has been the seventh trip of the group's members. We have already been to the GDR where we saw the withdrawal of the 25th and 32nd armoured division, we watched the pulling out of the 13th armoured division from Hungary, we have been travelling to Czechoslovakia and Mongolia. According to our data, more than 3,000 tanks, some 600 artillery guns, over 40 planes, and some 26,000 soldiers have been withdrawn from the territories of those five countries to date. Please note that the Soviet Union, in connection with its new doctrine, is withdrawing its units mainly from the border line of the Warsaw Pact and NATO. They are chiefly armoured units, that is having an offensive character. And the units which are not being withdrawn are being re-armed: tanks—offensive weapons are being pulled out while antitank means—defensive weapons are being introduced. [sentence as received]

"These three withdrawn armoured divisions will be disbanded as early as August on the territory of the Kiev and Odessa military districts. In the next year another three tank divisions will be reduced but the exact date of the operation has not been fixed yet," Rogov continued.

"We think that the international community should have a possibility of controlling the process of disarmament. Our opinion is that were an agreement to be signed in Vienna on a multilateral reduction of troops, the arrangements should concern not only the control by the military of the two blocs but also by the international community," said the representative of the group which is financed by the Soviet Fund of Peace.

Mediterranean, European Security Seen Linked

52000057 Moscow PRAVDA (Second Edition) in Russian 21 Jun 89 p 4

[Article by L. Medvedko, doctor of historical sciences: "Fair Winds and Dangerous Reefs; Problems of Mediterranean Security"]

[Text] The storm clouds of military conflicts, like the mark of Cain, have from time immemorial cast a shadow over the entire Mediterranean. Its shores have been scorched with the fire of two world wars. And even in the postwar period the local and regional conflicts which have flared here have repeatedly threatened to drag mankind into the abyss, this time an abyss of nuclear war which would be suicidal.

The problem of Mediterranean security also has its peculiarities. It seems to be a derivative of several problems at once—European security, normalization of conditions in the Near East, and stabilization of the

situation in North Africa. Such a strategic multicomplexity is the result of the peculiar position of the Mediterranean—not only geographical, but also political-economic.

It is no secret that not only the interests of the Mediterranean countries and their neighboring states collide and intertwine here, but also those of the great powers. From the standpoint of Western politicians and military specialists, the Mediterranean today remains the most strategically vulnerable region.

On the background of the growing tendency toward relaxation of tensions and disarmament in Europe, the Mediterranean still remains a military proving ground and the focus of one of the most age-old conflicts—the Near Eastern conflict.

As for the military aspect, NATO, as we know, maintains a considerable portion of its forces there, including over 1,800 combat aircraft and around 800 large submarines and naval vessels. At the same time, NATO bookkeepers are trying to exclude these from the overall balance of powers in Europe. Yet these "conventional" forces are far from conventional. The appearance of long range missiles on the ships makes the fleets even more powerful in their strike capability than they currently are. As a result, ships and submarines become the ideal offensive weapon for sudden strikes. Consequently, measures for changing over ground troops to a defensive structure must at least be reinforced by a limitation of the offensive capabilities of the military-naval forces as well.

If we mark the American military bases and facilities with stars on a map, we will see that along the perimeter of the Mediterranean Sea there will almost be more than there are on the U.S. flag—the stars and stripes. The same may be said about the American "rapid deployment forces", or the so-called multinational and occupation forces of the USA's strategic allies. There are quite enough of them both on the European and on the African shores, and in the Near East. At the same time, there is not one single Soviet base on the shores of the Mediterranean. Also, we have no troops in any of the Mediterranean hot spots or in any of the contiguous regions of the Near East.

At the same time, the development of the situation in the regions adjoining Europe gives new dimensions also to European security itself. It is no accident that this circumstance was noted by all the participants of the meeting of foreign affairs ministers from 35 countries which was held in Vienna last spring. This meeting opened a new round of talks on conventional armed forces in Europe and on the measures for strengthening trust and security.

Speaking at the Vienna meeting of ministers, E. A. Shevardnadze called for synchronizing the processes of disarmament in Europe and regulation in the Near East. For this purpose, stressed the Soviet minister of foreign

affairs, it is necessary to decisively reject the rudimentary psychology, and to contrapose confrontation with mutual cooperation. We must not try to play on contradictions, as for example those of Israel with the Arabs or Iran with the West. Rather we must work together for the purpose of untying the knots of conflict and strengthening security not only in Europe itself, but also around it.

It is specifically in the Mediterranean, in the words of the English journal *ECONOMIST*, that "the star of peace has twinkled intermittently". Evidence of this fact is the unceasing aggression of Israel against Lebanon, the brigandage on the land of Palestine, where Israeli soldiers are killing unarmed people. The arms race has taken on gigantic proportions in the Near East. There is the danger of emergence of chemical and nuclear weapons and high capability missiles. There have been upsurges of militancy by the U.S. 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean Sea, where the Americans shot down two Lebanese aircraft over international waters. All this echoes the strategy of "neoglobalism", which places the stakes on the imagined gains in the so-called low intensity conflicts.

Although the Mediterranean is geographically viewed as a part of Europe, the Near East and North Africa, their security is indivisible. The realization of the Soviet Union's proposals for demilitarizing the Mediterranean Sea, which would at the same time include also the pullout of American and Soviet military vessels from that region, would undoubtedly rectify the situation in each of these regions. The inverse dependence is also evident. The end of the Iran-Iraq War, the cessation of armed conflict in Chad and in the Western Sahara strengthen not only the potential of the Arab world. It is something else that is much more important. The blocking of the age-old regional conflict strengthens the potential for peace in the entire world and, of course, also in the Mediterranean.

In this connection, we must note the importance of the consensus which is being formed on the question of convening an international conference on the Near East. Who is counteracting this now? As evidenced by the results of the all-Arab summit meeting in Casablanca, the Arabs today see no other variant for regulation other than convening such a forum. In essence, only Israel stands in opposition to this idea.

Of course, it is not easy to immediately remove all the obstacles and disagreements. Yet already now we can begin the practical preparations for an international conference on the level of traditional as well as "people's diplomacy". The Soviet Union is proposing that even before convening this conference we give freedom to the peacemaking potential of the UN for ensuring mutually acceptable flexible forms of constructive interaction of all the parties involved in regulating the Near Eastern situation.

In short, we are speaking of revitalizing the "ecological environment" both in the Mediterranean and in the sphere of international relations in general. The adherence to the basic principles presented in the speech of M. S. Gorbachev at the 43rd session of the UN General Assembly would correspond to this goal.

Guided by the new political thinking and soberly considering the existing realities, the Soviet Union has presented a constructive and specific program for ensuring security in the Mediterranean. It provides for the reduction of the high level of nuclear opposition which is retained here, the liquidation of foreign military bases and facilities held by non-Mediterranean states, the limitation of activity and scope of operation of military-naval forces, and the spread of measures for strengthening trust in this region in the spirit of the Stockholm agreements.

The constructive initiatives presented in M. S. Gorbachev's assessment of the international community during his visit to Yugoslavia in March of last year are of great importance in turning the Mediterranean Sea into a zone of peace and cooperation. Having confirmed the USSR's readiness to withdraw its military fleet from the Mediterranean if the USA does the same, the Soviet leader proposed that we do not put this off indefinitely, and, as a first step, that we freeze the number of vessels and the potential of the military-naval forces of both countries. Then we could establish quantitative limits for them. Prior to coordinating the general measures of trust in the spirit of the Stockholm agreements, the Soviet Union and the USA could inform each other and all the Mediterranean countries in a timely manner on ship movements, as well as military exercises, and invite observers to them.

It has been proposed that at the upcoming special conference on the Mediterranean we review the means and methods for continued development of various aspects of cooperation for the purpose of expanding its framework and aiding in strengthening trust and security in the region.

The building of our common European home is also tied with the fate of the Mediterranean. The path to it lies through the joint, peaceful political solution of the current problems: bilateral, global, and regional. This would help the peoples of the region to establish a safe world, to put an end to the arms race, and to change over to broad cooperation. The sails of the new political thinking are now filling with fair winds. Yet, in charting the course to the new shore, we must overcome the dangerous reefs of confrontation which lie in wait for the cause of peace.

INF Destruction Hit on Economic Grounds
52000062z Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA
INDUSTRIYA in Russian 13 Apr 89 p 2

[Excerpts from readers' letters and commentary: "Today Begins Tomorrow"; for the text of the interview with O. Mamalyga referred to in the introduction, see the FBIS Daily Report: SOVIET UNION, FBIS-SOV-89-080, 27 April 89 pp 8-11]

[Text] Formally we workers of enterprises of the former Ministry of Light and the Food Industry, came under the aegis of the "defense industry" just a few days ago. Actually, even before this a certain part of our output was oriented toward special (read: defense) products. So the discussion conducted by the newspaper on problems of conversion misplaces us twice over. The wall mentioned by O. Mamalyga ("Economics of Disarmament," SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA, 13 April of this year) runs not by us but through us. This is probably why we are especially sensitive to cases of destruction of colossal material values in connection with the INF [Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces] Treaty. These values were created through the incredible efforts of generations of Soviet people, their sweat and blood, prolonged self-discipline, and billions and billions taken from our pockets!

Of course to eliminate war and save civilization is a lofty and noble goal. But why destroy material values... No, we cannot reconcile ourselves to this approach. Because the great scientific-technical and material potential created in the defense branches can and should serve the national good not tomorrow but today.

Even yesterday one could not dream of using the technology of some secret shop or section for the manufacture of regular products. But now specialists from the defense complex have visited us. Proposals were generated and they have been realized. Here is just one example.

We have traditionally used thin-walled pipes for manufacturing the working parts of the carding machine for processing flax and wool. The turner was the main figure here. From these parts alone 210 tons of metal went to shavings. And there were not enough turners and the metal wrong and the quality was not quite good enough. Recently we have been using rotation drawing which previously was far beyond our reach. Productivity increased by a factor of 5-6. The coefficient of the utilization of metal increased to 0.85. What was previously unattainable quality of the component became a reality. Thirty highly skilled turners are being released.

Is that good? Yes. But still...I still will not say that we are experiencing deep satisfaction.

A couple of days ago the figures were made public: By the end of the year 40 percent of the military production should be changed over to civilian. Naturally, I cannot give the specific figure for our association. But the

volume of defense industry products is decreasing, and significantly. And this means that the materials, components, and batching items that were ordered at one time will become so-called nonliquid assets. I repeat other SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA authors: Their value is very great.

Among the batching items, for example, that will become nonliquid assets, for example, are valves. Probably millions of these simple components are used in national economic output. But they are qualitatively different items. For example, the valves for agricultural irrigation equipment do not last very long since they are made of far from the best grades of metal. But our valves, when they are used in frigates or other similar equipment, will last for years or perhaps decades. Do we have a right to expatiate on any real advantage of we do not use them for their intended purposes?

The list of our nonliquid assets includes both the latest items and those created years ago. But both are guarded by conditions of the strictest secrecy. It would seem that the first step in normalizing and streamlining the process of conversion should be a legislative act from the highest state organ of authority which would establish the specific period of a ban on the outflow of parts, components, materials, and technologies from the defense industry into the peacetime branches. I emphasize: We need a mandatory law which is the same for all ministries and departments, for all of today's "pyramid" of the defense industry.

When will such an act appear? Time will not stand still: The destruction of the resources is not far in the future. And we are certainly not speaking about Tekhmash alone: Our association is only a speck of dust in comparison to the giants of the defense complex. So we can only guess at the amounts of the forthcoming losses. So before adopting a law on the transfer, apparently, it is necessary to have some kind of decree or instructions from the USSR Council of Ministers concerning conducting in the branches competitions of proposals for the utilization of technologies, materials, and components. Discussions of problems of conversion must be put on a practical basis. And competitions will be a realistic mechanism for counteracting the destruction of property that has accumulated in the warehouses.

It is far from easy to break down what has been formed over decades by the administrative management system. And it must be broken down not by command methods (although it is impossible to do without regulating legal acts) but by economic ones. And the most important of them is placing the entire budget both of the army and of the industry that supports it under the public control of officials elected by the people. Let the military request funds based on the doctrine of adequate defense. And the people's deputies at the congresses, after careful and open analysis of the appetites of the military department,

decide the quantity of funds to allot and for which items. Then we shall not have this senseless freezing of resources that could effectively serve for our well-being.

[signed] V. Zhestkov, general director of the Tekhmash PO [Production Association], Orel

Lines From Letters

In my opinion, the designer O. Mamalyga has changed the problem of conversion into an aspect of public opinion. With our generally recognized poverty and inefficiency we are still destroying the final results of production—the commodity! Indeed, what nonsense!

I completely and fully support the idea of "economical disarmament" for its practical significance and purposefulness.

[signed] V. Samodin, Moscow Oblast

Why not use the destroyed missiles for peaceful (world) purposes? Why not create a space station under the aegis of the United Nations? We could count how many launches could be made from one of our units and one American one and leave a corresponding number of missiles intact. And then at the request of any of the UN member nations we could launch them for peaceful purposes. Perhaps even free of charge. And we could organize a competition of scientific programs! In this case the missiles would still be destroyed but it would be for the good of mankind.

I fully support O. Mamalyga's proposals. I myself served in Kapustin Yar during the seventies. I know what missiles are. I think we must take an economical approach to writing off military equipment. Why not use the missiles for launching communications satellites? This would significantly expand and improve telephone communications in the country as well as the number of radio and television channels. For unlike European countries, which have satellite television throughout Europe, we have nothing of the kind.

[signed] V. Shcherbak, Krasnodar Kray

Like all Soviet people, I welcomed the INF Treaty. But when I saw on television how they are destroying the missiles with explosions I was so upset: Such a barbarian way of destroying public (albeit military) property! Do we really not have the intelligence to use the complete missiles systems that are being eliminated for the needs of the national economy?

Esteemed editors, ask the responsible officials to respond on the pages of your newspaper (SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA is also my newspaper; I have subscribed to it since the first issue) to the questions raised by O. Mamalyga.

[signed] G. Makarin, Belgorod

Our Commentary

As the mail shows, the conversation with the military equipment designer Oleg Ivanovich Mamalyga interested the readers a great deal. Alas, among the responses there were no answers from ministries and departments involved in the problem. Neither from defense nor civilian departments. We asked USSR Minister of Defense D. Yazov personally to grant the newspaper an interview concerning problems of conversion and disarmament. For you cannot get away from problems in this way which is not very popular in a time of glasnost. And, judging from the forthcoming disarmament, the army has many problems. And the army can hardly conquer them by itself. Or does the comrade minister think differently?

[signed] I. Klimenko, newspaper's editor for the department of machine building and new technology.

GDR Scholar Criticizes A. Arbatov on Causes of Arms Race

Editorial Introduction

52000063 Moscow *MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA* in Russian No 3 Mar 89 p 115

[Articles under the common rubric "Polemics"; for the texts of the articles by A. Arbatov and E. Pozdnyakov referred to in the editorial introduction, see the JPRS Report: ARMS CONTROL, JPRS-TAC-88-037, 6 October 1988, pp 9-17 and 22-30, and JPRS-TAC-89-005, 7 February 1989, pp 25-34]

[Text] In Issues 5 and 10 of our journal for 1988 a debate was conducted between doctors of historical sciences A. Arbatov and E. Pozdnyakov on the question of the correlation of the political and material-technical aspects of the arms race. The editorial office has received a letter from S. Henke, a staff member of the GDR International Relations Institute, in which he expresses his viewpoint on this problem. We publish the letter and A. Arbatov's response.

Political Role of Nuclear Weapons

52000063 Moscow *MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA* in Russian No 3, Mar 89 pp 115-118

[Article by S. Henke: "There Is Still Cause for Argument"]

[Text] The argument carried in the October issue of *MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA* between the well-known political scientists E. Pozdnyakov and A. Arbatov could not have failed to have attracted attention for the simple reason that at the center thereof was really one of the key

issues being discussed today within the framework of the "new thinking" and in the process of the search for new approaches to the solution of a central problem of world politics.

What is the argument about? A. Arbatov reproaches his colleague (and his "sympathizers") for an undue preoccupation with "high policy matters" and an insufficient consideration of the complexities of real life, that is, specifics of the military-strategic, military-technical aspects of the confrontation of the two military-political groupings.

While acknowledging by and large ("at a very high level of generalization") the primacy of political goal-setting over the means of realizing the goals, the author, whom I respect, criticizes E. Pozdnyakov for making an absolute of this cause-and-effect relationship leading to a disregard for the relatively independent significance of the arms race, which has changed to a considerable extent from a simple effect of the policy of confrontation to a cause thereof.¹ And although A. Arbatov, in turn, warns repeatedly against "making an absolute of the significance of purely military factors," the quintessence of his arguments both in the article (MEMO Nos 4 and 5) and in his response to E. Pozdnyakov's article (No 10) nonetheless amounts precisely to an affirmation of the proposition concerning the relative independence of the military-strategic factor, which has in the era of super-destructive nuclear arms begun to "lie heavy" on policy, limit its choice and even determine its goals ("the tail wagging the dog"). This proposition could in principle hardly evoke objections from anyone (and least of all, I believe, from E. Pozdnyakov, who emphasizes the existence of this feedback); the sole correction might be that wording of "the devastating power of nuclear weapons has upset the traditional cause and effect relationship of policy and military power" or "the means have become an absolute, an end in themselves" type is, first, unduly categorical and, second, can hardly be equally right in respect of both sides (V. Gantman, whom both authors quote, speaks merely of a "certain independence," of "influence" and so forth).

These "corrections" could be attributed to the "cosmetic" category and the argument itself considered a misunderstanding if we accept the mode of reasoning chosen by A. Arbatov for proof of the discrepancy between the "opponent's formal logic" and the realities of our time. A. Arbatov sees as the weakness of this logic the fact that the "elimination" or, at least, "an appreciable undermining of the political basis of the conflict," being, according to E. Pozdnyakov, an indispensable condition of the elimination of the arms race, are either insufficient (if it be a question of complete disarmament or not obligatory (if the parties pursue more modest goals, to which the author attributes a 50-percent reduction in strategic offensive arms, deep cuts in armed forces and conventional arms in Europe, the banning and elimination of chemical weapons and other measures).

The "either" could serve perfectly well as a working hypothesis if, of course, we disregard the fact that solution of the "main contradiction of the era" would remove the principal obstacles in the way of a "fundamental rearrangement of international relations" and a lowering of the political stakes and thereby the level of confrontation in interstate relations; the certain "slight-iness" with which A. Arbatov speaks of the significance of a surmounting of the political conflict for an end to the arms race—"this... would take immeasurably more"—deprives of persuasiveness his own reservations concerning the primacy of the political motives of military rivalry.

It is considerably more difficult agreeing with the "or".

A. Arbatov writes: "If, however, what is meant is more modest tasks and closer prospects, arms reduction and limitation can hardly be made dependent on the 'elimination or, at least, undermining' of the essential division of the world into opposite systems...."² Thank God, the author continues, that progress in the business of arms reduction and limitation is possible even without elimination of the political causes of the military rivalry—otherwise "neither the 1963 Moscow treaty banning nuclear test in three media nor other treaties of the 1960's-1970's nor the INF treaty would have been possible."

Such reasoning would seem to me, from the viewpoint of what the author wishes to prove, extremely vulnerable. First, it has to be seen that the agreements of the 1960's and 1970's, which he adduces as an example, were on each occasion possible as the result of a certain reduction in the level of political confrontation between the USSR and the United States; and how other than by the "undermining of the political basis of conflict" may this reduction be considered?

Second, these agreements were the more substantial, the more significant was the change in political priorities—the transition to the "indirect" or "peaceful" strategy of J.F. Kennedy (we recall his celebrated speech at American University in the summer of 1963) and, even more, the proclamation of the "Nixon Doctrine," which brought the United States to official recognition of the need for peaceful coexistence, represented precisely such a change. As far, on the contrary, as local and regional crises from the Korean War through the events in Afghanistan are concerned, there are evidently no grounds for argument here: it is simply that the authors are saying in different words the same thing. These grounds emerge when A. Arbatov, while rightly pointing to the conversion of the arms race into a substitute for war ("continuation of war by other means"), concludes from this that, by analogy with nuclear war, the arms race also, by virtue of its "seeming irrationality," ceases to be simply an effect of policy and becomes, in turn, a "most important conflict of political interests."

But it is precisely the point that the "irrationality" of the militarist programs of the Pentagon is really only seeming; it would be real were these programs geared to a global "hot" war, and not at the "cold," economic, exhaustion of the enemy (E. A. Shevardnadze called attention to this political function of the arms race in the report at a Foreign Ministry scientific-practical conference).

Substantiating the self-sufficing role of the nuclear factor, A. Arbatov asks the rhetorical question: "...what event in the international arena could create such a threat to your interests as the physical capacity of the other power at his choice to completely wipe you out as a nation and a state within half an hour?" If the logic of this question is correct, why are some states (Japan, whose present economic expansionism would by the yardsticks of the 19th-first half of the 20th centuries be sufficient grounds for war; China; and so forth) unconcerned by this physical capacity of the United States, while others (the USSR and its allies) perfectly correctly see it as a threat? And why is the analogous military power of the Soviet Union, which even recently was a burden on Soviet-Chinese relations, today, evidently, no longer blocking their improvement? The INF Treaty, which represented, in M. S. Gorbachev's words, "a benchmark political event," "a reference point of the era of nuclear disarmament," an event whose significance may be assessed in full, possibly, only by historians of the future, illustrates more clearly than much else the connection between an improvement in policy and progress in the sphere of disarmament.

We have the natural question: if this assessment is not simply handsome metaphors and the treaty really does symbolize a "change of eras" (or, more modestly, the start of practical movement toward a nuclear-free and nonviolent world), can it be imagined that such a breakthrough was conceivable without a "change in political causes"? To deny such changes would mean, at least, underestimating the entire depth of the revolution which has been under way recently in our views of the world in general and the theory and practice of peaceful coexistence in particular.

Of course, the world is, as before, divided into opposite systems and military-political groupings; but we see the nature and "parameters" of this division today in an entirely different light from that of all preceding stages of the "cohabitation" of the two systems, that is, at the stages when our political relations—and, in the wake of them, all else—were shaped under the influence of the proposition concerning the total incompatibility not only of our class and ideological but also state, including military-political, interest. We looked on the world's interdependence as a diversion of the Trilateralists; we considered the main contradiction of the era the division of the world into two systems; peaceful coexistence was for us in theory a form of class struggle, and from the viewpoint of practice, either a breathing-space or, in any event, a short-lived phenomenon; the detente of the

1970's was interpreted as our victory and the defeat of the other side. It was not we who had initiated the arms race, but the "contribution" of these purely political concepts of ours to the dynamics and forms of the military rivalry of the USSR and the United States and the "separation" of the military means from the policy ends of the socialist state is today obvious. It was these concepts, and by no means the logic of the military-technical revolution, which determined primarily both our military doctrine substantiating in practice up to the end of the 1970's the possibility and necessity of victory in a "just" nuclear war and our extensive military development and predominantly quantitative approach to an interpretation of parity; these concepts facilitated propaganda support for the Pentagon's militarist programs.

I would like to stress that it was precisely the surmounting of the above-mentioned political, more, philosophical and, we would add, dogmatic views of the nature and place of the intersystem conflict in the world historical process which made possible affirmation of the new political thinking, the quintessence of which may be considered the following conclusion: the new quality of interdependence has modified the dialectics of the rivalry and cooperation of the two systems; cooperation is moving to the forefront, rivalry, on the other hand, is assuming the form of peaceful competition. Peaceful competition is becoming the principal form of movement of the main contradiction of the era.

It is this "recovery of sight" and alignment of our thinking with the changed material form of being which has enabled us to switch policy as a whole—both domestic and foreign (and also such a component of the latter as security policy)—to a new system of coordinates, whose main structural components are the priority of values common to all mankind, consistent recognition of the historical legitimacy of the social system confronting us, the need for a balance of interests and equal security and recognition of the supremacy of international law and the "exclusive domination of political means over all others" (E. A. Shevardnadze), which reflects an ongoing devaluation of coercion and its instruments as a universal trend in the development of human civilization. Reducing the "range" of these components merely to the international sphere would be just as invalid as in foreign policy, to the sphere of security policy, and in the latter, in turn, merely to the nuclear confrontation of the two powers. Born as a political and even diplomatic idea, peaceful coexistence crossed over, according to M. S. Gorbachev,³ to the sphere of fundamental laws of the era only after V. I. Lenin had formulated the NEP concept. The dependence of foreign policy on domestic policy was discussed in his report at the scientific-practical conference by E.A. Shevardnadze, who emphasized that the country's democratization was an essential condition and prerequisite of the democratization of international relations. This entire block of political movements has made it possible to look anew at the imperatives of security policy also—we now regard the security of the

other side as part of our own security. However, seeing the cause of this metamorphosis merely as the threat of nuclear apocalypse or reducing the community of security merely to the military sphere would mean committing the sin of the technocratic approach: first, man is threatened not only by "nuclear winter" and, second, the acceptance of such a cause as the sole one would induce the assumption that the main motive of our transition to the new thinking was the threat of nuclear catastrophe, with the curbing of which peaceful coexistence could once again be what it was in our understanding previously—"a specific form of class struggle".

The logic of A. Arbatov's arguments, according to which the INF treaty may serve as an illustration of progress in the disarmament sphere "directly," without the "elimination or, at least, undermining" of the political causes engendering the race, would seem in the light of all that has been said above more than contentious. Without a halt to the ideological and propaganda wrangling, without an authoritative statement on our part that we see today as a mortal threat to ourselves and to all mankind not the machinations of the class enemy but militarism of such,⁴ without consistent active work on doing away with the traditional "enemy image"—without such changes any "disarmament directly" cannot fail to be an illusion, if, of course, we mean disarmament capable of diverting from us the threat of collective suicide.

So, to sum up: however isolated and self-sufficing the role of nuclear superarms may seem to us today, they remain the product of political goal-setting, on the nature of which it depends whether we will succeed in continuing our progress toward real disarmament. The desire to jump back from the brink of the nuclear abyss is a very strong stimulus to the organization of the coexistence of the two systems on new principles, but it merely contributes—among others—to recognition of a broader complex of imperatives of the interdependent world.

A most important prerequisite of the movement that has begun toward a new, nonviolent condition of the world is the surmounting of the narrow-class approach which has been predominant until recently to the needs of social development as a whole and recognition of the priority of the common, unifying interests of the two competing systems over the class interests disuniting them. The establishment of this approach in the policy of the USSR and the growing understanding of the lack of alternatives to this policy on the part of influential political circles in the West is that most fundamental change in "political causes" which made possible the signing of the INF Treaty and gives hope for future, bigger successes. Without these changes our efforts would truly hardly be going beyond the framework of treatment of the symptoms of the disease. However important the elimination of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles may be, it should not be forgotten that there remains in the arsenal of the nuclear powers at least a nineteenfold human civilization annihilation potential. And we would recall, finally,

that even prior to ratification of this treaty, prior to any movements in the military-technical sphere, the CPSU Central Committee deeded it possible in the theses for the 19th party conference to draw the conclusion concerning a lessening of the threat of war and an improvement in the Soviet Union's international position—and not thanks to an increase in strength but as the result of increased trust in our country.

To be honest, I do not see where E. Pozdnyakov infringed the competence of the “physicists”. If this infringement is seen as being criticism of our recent general preoccupation with the technocratic approach to the content of security policy and attempts to comprehend the conclusion of the 27th CPSU Congress to the effect that security is today becoming chiefly a political problem and may be safeguarded merely by political means, a reproach of negligence (if even this) would have been merited by the “lyric poets” merely in the event of their having shunned such attempts. If they had agreed that the category of security or even strategic stability may really be expressed in categories of arms ceilings, levels and sublimits. Had they taken on trust the view of parity, which is still current, as the “approximate equivalence of the USSR and the United States in respect of the basic, most obvious indicators,” and not as “a capacity under all conditions of nuclear attack to inflict on the aggressor by a retaliatory strike unacceptable damage”. Explaining which of these two mutually contradictory notions of parity (which live side by side harmoniously in A. Arbatov's last article)⁵ corresponds to the criteria of reasonable sufficiency is, in turn, the duty of the “physicists,” who, like their “lyric poet” allies, are only just embarking on the search for the saving “philosophers' stone”.

Footnotes

1. MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA No 5, 1988, pp 20-21.

2. Ibid., No 10, 1988, p 132.

3. See M. S. Gorbachev, “Selected Speeches and Articles,” vol 5, Moscow, 1988, p 437.

4. The main sources of the threat to our security, Academician G. A. Arbatov writes, “we see... today—granted all the difficulties in relations with the United States, with the West—not in the United States, not in NATO, not in capitalism as such but in militarism. Militarism has become a general danger, a threat to all” (MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI, 25 September 1988, p 5).

5. See MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN No 9, 1988, pp 82, 89. COPYRIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS “Pravda”. “Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya”, 1989.

Arbatov Replies

5200063 Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 3, Mar 89 pp 118-121

[Article by A. Arbatov: “Once Again About Politics and Armaments”]

[Text] The letter of S. Henke, a political scientist from the GDR who is well known in our scientific circles, raises a number of serious problems, which prompts me to return once more to this inexhaustible and important subject.

A principal question giving rise to disagreements is whether it is necessary to “eliminate or, at least, appreciably undermine” the political basis of the arms race to eliminate or, at least, partially limit it. As in any scientific discussion, it is necessary in order to understand one another to agree on the meaning of the terms.

Otherwise it could be like two squint-eyed pedestrians bumping into one another on the sidewalk, after which one fires off at the other the reproach: “Why don't you look where you are going?” To which the other replies: “And why don't you go where you are looking?”

So what is understood by the political causes and the political basis of the arms race? E. Pozdnyakov, who is defended by our German colleague and whose reasoning he considers impeccable, defines them as follows: “the division of the world into opposite socioeconomic systems and military-political groupings of states corresponding thereto intensified by ideological intolerance in respect of one another.”¹

Elimination of the arms race is a very nebulous proposition, but if understood literally, it means nothing other than general and complete disarmament. For as long as military power remains an instrument of states' policy and a factor of relations between them and as long as S&T progress continues, military competition will continue. The scale, directions, danger and economic burdensomeness thereof may vary within a broad range (depending on arms limitation and reduction agreements included), but completely eliminating, that is, halting, it under such conditions is hardly possible.

Let us now ask: is the abolition of the division of the world into opposite socioeconomic systems and military-political groupings of states ideologically intolerant of one another sufficient for general and complete disarmament? I believe not. It is possible to imagine the mutual ideological tolerance of states with different social systems and even the disbandment of the present military-political blocs. But what is meant by the elimination of the division of the world into opposite socioeconomic systems: the victory of socialism in them or capitalism with us or convergence? It may, incidentally, for the sake

of intellectual experiment, be allowed that the division into two social systems may somehow be eliminated also. Would the basis of the arms race then disappear?

Repeating what is generally known, I would recall that both the first and second world wars erupted between socially more or less homogeneous capitalist states and alliances. And the experience of recent decades testifies, unfortunately, that military confrontation, an arms race and armed conflicts are possible between socialist countries also. And the nuclear arms race itself, if its genesis is studied completely, began not between the USSR and the United States and the Warsaw Pact and NATO but between states of the anti-Hitler coalition and the Axis powers. Nuclear weapons were used for the first and, as yet, only time in August 1945, at the turning point of two eras, by one of today's two closest allies against the other. And this is an objective and tragic fact, however much we may argue about whether there was a military need for this and against whom this act was directed in the military-psychological plane.

Besides the central military confrontation of East and West, we now see a growth of the arms race, including the process of its nuclearization, at the regional level—in South Asia, the Near and Middle East, Southern Africa, and Latin America. There are at the basis of these most dangerous processes political causes other than those about which E. Pozdnyakov and S. Henke speak and which intensify, but do not determine the said dangerous trends.

It is naive to think that the USSR and the United States have only to come to an arrangement with one another, and there will be peace and plenty in the world. Given the rapidity of the changes occurring in the international arena, one can perfectly well imagine that in several decades the configuration of the alliances of states and military balances will be quite different and that even the political foundations of the present arms race which my respected opponents highlight will be a considerable extent have been eliminated or modified. In mathematics there is the concept of necessary and sufficient. The elimination of the above-mentioned "political foundations" would seem to me not necessary and insufficient inasmuch as, in any event, it is a question of the existence in the world of opposite social systems.

In order to eliminate the arms race and achieve general and complete disarmament what is needed—and I wish to repeat this as strongly as possible—is immeasurably, more along the lines of a fundamental reorganization of international relations, and not only in the plane suggested by my colleagues, what is more, but in a multidimensional, volumetric plane—for the purpose of the creation of new ways of settling conflicts between states in place of those which have been employed for millennia.

Now about partial arms limitations and reduction measures. Hardly anyone will dispute the elementary truth that an exacerbation of general East-West political tension and an escalation of "ideological wrangling" between them (as S. Henke puts it) do not contribute to the achievement of agreements on such measures. But even here the relationship is far from unambivalent, however convenient and attractive simple logical syllogisms are. The fate of the SALT II Treaty is graphic confirmation of this.

It may be assumed perfectly well that had the United States considered this treaty in terms of its strategic content far more beneficial and had prior to the events in Afghanistan even the criticism of circles of the right not "gutted" the SALT II in respect of the essence of its terms and limitations, a Democratic U.S. Government would hardly have ventured to have, as it was put at that time, "derailed" it in 1979. Afterward, having stoked up to unprecedented levels the propaganda attacks on the USSR and having called us the "evil empire," the Reagan administration declared practically simultaneously in 1981 that it would not undermine the terms of SALT II. But in 1986, when the intensity of the strain in Soviet-American relations had diminished noticeably, following the top-level meeting in Geneva and not long before the meeting in Reykjavik, the United States was, for all that, violating the treaty's limitations.

All this indicates that even secondary, aggravating aspects of the political foundation of the arms race ("ideological intolerance") do not directly influence the process of its limitation, which has appreciable specific features and a fair degree of autonomy. As far as the primary, objective components of this foundation, as my critics interpret it, are concerned, their "elimination or undermining" can all the less be seen as an indisputable condition of, although partial, very important arms limitation and reduction measures. Let us not bandy words but make our positions clear, as they say. A lowering of general political tension and an easing of the propaganda rhetoric undoubtedly contribute to the emergence of good will in the search for compromise at negotiations. And at the same time, on the other hand, movements of negotiating positions bringing the parties closer to an understanding change their attitude toward one another and compel a moderation of the rhetorical ardor and a new look at other of their contradictions also. There is a closed dialectical relationship here, and what comes first, the "chicken" or the "egg," is an insoluble question, and not that important. After all, negotiations on curbing the arms race are themselves a most important specific sphere of states' political relations, as also military rivalry between them.

However, the fundamental factors which objectively exist—the division of the world into opposite socioeconomic systems and military-political groupings of states—are by no means eliminated here and are not undermined, regardless of the fact that yesterday someone was calling us the "evil empire," but today has taken

it back. The relations of these systems and groupings change, but not their essence and the fact of their objective existence. We have an immense way to go in arms limitation and reduction, the settlement of other international conflicts and the establishment of cooperation in different spheres of concurrent interests before it is necessary to put these fundamental realities on the agenda of negotiations and compromise. If, however, the "cart is put before the horse" and progress in disarmament is made dependent on the "elimination or undermining" of the world's division into opposite systems and groupings, we shall not take a step forward in the one or the other or a third direction.

The race in arms, nuclear particularly, has acquired tremendous force of inertia and has in a certain way become separated from the other spheres of international relations. It was in the period of a thaw in Soviet-American relations and the signing of the 1963 treaty limiting nuclear testing that the buildup of ballistic missiles of the United States and, in the wake of this, the USSR achieved the highest rate in history. There was an intensive buildup of nuclear warheads in the strategic forces thanks to missiles with multiple reentry vehicles together with the relaxation of tension and the achievement of the ABM Treaty and the SALT I agreement at the start of the 1970's.

Now, against the background of the marked improvement in relations between the USSR and the United States, following the INF treaty coming into force, the deployment of a new generation of strategic offensive arms continues at an invariable pace. And a specific feature of this sphere, what is more, are its long-term parameters also. Arms are being deployed currently which were developed 20 years ago and intended for service right into the 21st century, which we would like to see nuclear-free and nonviolent. Consequently, it is necessary to deal directly with these problems also, without waiting for some additional propitious political changes. That the relations of the leading states are far from exhausted by questions of arms limitation, just as the danger of war also does not amount to nuclear rivalry, is another matter. Efforts are needed in other directions also, and not only in the sphere of relations between the USSR and the United States, what is more, and one cannot replace the other here.

Indeed, the mere existence of the nuclear confrontation creates more than any other international conflict an immanent threat to states' national security. In this connection I also would permit myself to disagree with S. Henke and express the assumption that, say, the nuclear forces of the United States in aggregate with the nuclear potential of the Soviet Union which confronts them create a tremendous danger to both Japan and West Europe and the two great powers themselves (although, naturally, it is not one's own arms or those of one's allies but the weapons of a potential enemy which are perceived as the paramount threat). But it is for this reason

that we proclaim that all states have a common enemy—militarism—created by the aggregate efforts of both parties and requiring joint action for a lessening of the existing threat.

The military balance is just one sphere of states' mutual relations. The latter may improve or deteriorate in a very wide political range, even if the military sphere remains invariable. but, nonetheless, limits of this range exist and are determined, specifically, by the military confrontation. Contrary to the proposition of my German colleague, politicians cannot, despite all their desire to improve states' relations, on a long-term basis simply by an effort of will dematerialize these more than palpable factors. Soviet-Chinese relations, for example, have in recent years been palpably changing for the better, and this process will, we hope, develop. But has the element of military danger been eliminated from our mutual perception? For what reason, in that case, does China keep its nuclear forces, for adornment? It is no accident that we are raising so insistently the question of a lowering of the military confrontation of the two powers in their border areas as far as its complete demilitarization and of the PRC's involvement at a particular stage in the nuclear disarmament process—as a most important aspect of an improvement in Soviet-Chinese relations in the long term.

The arguments of my opponent from the GDR concerning the relationship of the molding of new political thinking and the achievement of the INF treaty are in no way contradictory to the opinions which I have expressed. He is hurling himself against an open door here, as they say. And the authoritative quotations which he adduces would seem in this case utterly superfluous: the arguments of S. Henke himself would have been perfectly sufficient—had they been convincing where it counts. Thus the fundamental nature of the restructuring of Soviet security philosophy as a prerequisite of the INF Treaty is not in doubt. But at the same time the new thinking would remain a set of fine phrases and hardly anyone would believe it to be serious were it not embodied in something specific. In this treaty included, with all its technical parameters, sublimits and most intricate system of verification, arms liquidation procedures and such.

I also agree that the threat of nuclear catastrophe is not the sole cause of the revision of our philosophy of security. True, the problem which S. Henke poses: how we will live after we have curbed the nuclear threat and how to prevent a return to an understanding of peaceful coexistence as a "specific form of class struggle" seems to me somewhat premature. It is like a seriously ill patient worrying whether he should go home by taxi or metro after he has been discharged from hospital. If, incidentally, the prerequisites determined by my colleague are accepted, his question presupposes a very simple answer: there would be no returning to an archaic understanding

of the nature of peaceful coexistence after the nuclear danger has been curbed otherwise the nuclear danger would be revived once again.

S. Henke is right when he concludes that the "physicists" are only just embarking on the search for the "philosophers' stone" (although neither term is all that fortunate, perhaps). But some questions have already been perfectly resolved. In particular, I see nothing strange and original in the fact that "parity, as the approximate equality of the USSR and the United States in terms of the basic, most graphic indicators" and "the capacity under any conditions of nuclear attack to inflict on the aggressor a retaliatory strike of unacceptable damage" do in fact get along harmoniously in my article. Just as harmoniously as, say, a comparison of my salary with that of my respected German colleague at the official rate of exchange of the ruble to the mark together with a comparison in terms of real purchasing power. The criterion of reasonable sufficiency, of course, is purchasing power, but the exchange rate correlation also plays a certain part, out of considerations of prestige, for example, or for negotiations (concerning the per diem allowance at the time of an exchange of visits, say).

The "strategic parity" concept should not be overburdened with a meaning not inherent in this term, for the expression of which its own wording exists. Parity is approximate equivalence or, at least, comparability in respect of some calculable parameters like, for example, the number of delivery systems or nuclear weapons. And an evaluation of the capacity (unilaterally or reciprocally) for a retaliatory strike implies an analysis of the stability of the correlation of forces with regard also for their qualitative characteristics: kill efficiency, flight time and survivability given a nuclear strike and also requires an analysis of the conditions (scenario) of the nuclear conflict and the level of unacceptable damage.

It is possible to have parity and even quantitative superiority, but insufficient forces for a retaliatory strike, and it is possible to have far fewer weapons than an enemy, but possess surplus potential for a retaliatory strike. Given the current superhigh quantitative levels of Soviet and American strategic forces even after a 50-percent reduction therein, the criteria of reasonable sufficiency will be dictated not so much by the requisite number of delivery systems and weapons as choice of measures in retaliation to the U.S. programs to replace the old arms with new ones.

In this sense the strategic stability of the nuclear balance of the USSR and the United States will depend to a considerable extent on the levels, sublimits and other limitations of the treaty on a 50-percent reduction in SOA. And, consequently—even though such an approach may seem too prosaic to some people—security also, a most important component of which is a strengthening of strategic stability at diminishing levels of the nuclear confrontation—will depend on these parameters. It would, of course, be an unforgivable

oversimplification to maintain that stability and security amount merely to this. But after the desire to "jump back from the brink of the nuclear abyss" has been proclaimed and reiterated many times, recognition of the "imperatives of an interdependent world" has been declared and the priority of "interests which unite... over those which disunite" has been recognized, both politicians and scholars have to condescend to levels and sublimits of an arms reduction, the timetable and terms of the withdrawal of forces from Afghanistan and to a multitude of specific questions. Otherwise, new thinking in policy will remain elevated rhetoric, and in science, abstract and fruitless scholastics. Otherwise we will not in practice be jumping back from anything and will be establishing no new priorities.

Footnote

1. MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNAROD-NYYE OTNOSHENIYA NO 10, 1988, p 128.

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Soviet Arms Reduction Initiatives Praised
91441174z Moscow AVIATSIYA I KOSMONAVTIKA
in Russian No 1, Jan 89 (signed to press
5 Dec 88) pp 46-47

[Article, published under the heading "Today's World and the New Thinking," by Candidate of Philosophical Sciences Col A. Fedurin and Maj V. Ovsyannikov: "From Concept to Reality"]

[Text] 15 January 1986 is a signal date in the calendar of peace fashioned by the efforts of progressive mankind. Three years ago M. S. Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, presented a declaration which became a point of departure for positive changes in relations between peoples. This document formulated a number of major foreign-policy actions, the core of which is a program calling for a phased build-down resulting in a nuclear-free world by the beginning of the 21st century.

The Soviet Union's long-term antinuclear initiative evoked extensive response in the West. Signing of a first agreement on nuclear arms reduction took place the following year—the Soviet-American INF Treaty. This was followed by a summit meeting in Moscow, at which the parties exchanged the documents putting the treaty into force, followed by the first phase of public elimination of nuclear missiles. And all this became possible thanks to a revolutionary breakthrough in grasping contemporary realities, which was dubbed the "new political thinking."

The new political thinking is a result of realistic application of dialectical-materialist teaching to cognition of the conflictive world political process. Thanks to this

thinking, Soviet disarmament initiatives and other concrete steps in the international arena received a solid and promising scientific foundation.

Wherein lies the strength of this modern methodology of intergovernmental relations, which is already producing very promising results?

The concept of new political thinking is a system of views which presupposes moving mankind out of an impasse onto the path of progressive resolution of urgent global problems. The root theoretical issue of this concept is the primacy of elements pertaining to mankind as a whole over class elements in actual world development and, consequently, in politics as well.

This applies first and foremost to military policy. The destructive capabilities of modern armed forces are such that unleashing war with the employment not only of nuclear arms but of precision conventional weapons as well, in conditions of highly developed nuclear engineering and chemical industry, will result in destruction not only of the opposing sides but of all civilization as well. It is therefore logical to ask the question of whether war makes sense today as a means of achieving political objectives.

Not only war but military preparations as well present a threat to the future of mankind. It is no secret that the industrial states are spending vast material and manpower resources on the arms race. As Western experts note, it is planned to spend approximately 71 billion dollars up to 1993 just on SDI research alone. Even today, at the research phase, SDI is comparable in its economic outlays to such major Pentagon programs as development of the MX missile and the B-1B bomber.

The global immorality of militarization lies in the fact that the West is concealing its military preparations behind "peace-seeking," "defensive" rhetoric and demagogic argument to the effect that "nuclear weapons will continue in the future playing a vitally essential role in preventing war." Certain reactionary circles are nurturing plans to modernize nuclear missile arms and to "compensate" for the intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles being eliminated pursuant to the Soviet-American INF Treaty.

Such measures include, in particular, deployment in Western Europe of up to 60 U.S. F-111 fighter-bombers in addition to 150 deployed aircraft of the same type—nuclear weapon delivery platforms capable of reaching Soviet soil. They also include redeployment to Italy of 72 U.S. Air Force F-16 fighters turned away by Spain. It is also planned to increase the offensive capabilities of strike aviation, arming aircraft with air-to-surface missiles with a range capability in excess of 300 km. The Pentagon recently decided to resume work on development of a communications system designed to function

during a nuclear war. All this is taking place to the traditional propaganda accompaniment of claims of the "possibility of a Soviet preemptive strike."

In order to knock a breach in this vicious circle, our country firmly declared: Not only a nuclear war proper but also preparations for nuclear war, that is, an arms race, and efforts to gain military superiority cannot objectively bring political gain to anybody.

We should note that efforts are not limited merely to proclaiming theoretical postulates. In recent years there have been many manifestations of good will on the part of the Soviet Union jointly with the brother socialist countries and their willingness to take the most radical steps for the sake of lessening confrontation and eliminating the threat of war. One such step is the adoption of a new plan by the Warsaw Pact member states on reduction of military forces and arms in Europe. It provides for implementation in three phases, with Warsaw Pact and NATO military forces ultimately given a purely defensive character, and limiting their military potential to a level excluding the possibility of carrying out a sneak attack.

The same methodological principle infuses the new Soviet proposals on Asian security presented in Krasnoyarsk by M. S. Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Aware of the concern on the part of Asian and Pacific nations, the Soviet Union will not increase quantities of any nuclear weapons in this region, a practice it has in fact been following for some time now.

Other initiatives include the proposal for a multilateral discussion of the possibility of reducing military confrontation in areas where the coastlines of the USSR, PRC, Japan, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and South Korea converge, with the aim of establishing a freeze on and proportionate reduction in levels of naval and air forces.

The timeliness of such initiatives is without question. The Far East, not without U.S. assistance, we might add, had figuratively speaking begun to be transformed into a powder keg. Japan, for example, has more than doubled its military expenditures in the last 10 years, as a result of which it is now in eighth place worldwide in military expenditures, and third among nonnuclear countries. In some categories of military hardware it has not only caught up with but has outstripped the NATO countries. According to a report in the magazine KOKUBO, by 1990 the Japanese Air Force will take delivery on 200 modern F-15 fighters and pull apace with air forces based in the Continental United States.

Why does Japan, whose territory is barely more than four percent as large as U.S. territory, need as many fighters as the United States? The official reply is that it is for defense against the Soviet military threat. The idea

of possible involvement in combat operations against the USSR is being pushed on Japanese military personnel. Here is what is stated in a report entitled "The Military Threat and Japan's Defense Strategy," prepared by the Japanese Center for Strategic Studies. If the U.S. Air Force launches an airstrike on Soviet bases on Sakhalin, in the Central Maritime Region and on the Kuril Islands, "it may be necessary for Japanese military personnel to take part in these offensive operations." They will consist in "independently and aggressively striking forward (read Soviet) bases in the northern territories, on Sakhalin and in other regions." These plans are not merely on paper. Preparations for their execution are being rehearsed in combined Japanese-U.S. exercises. Thus Japan is being transformed into an accomplice in U.S. global military adventures.

This policy is fostering an increase in the level of balance of military potential, including nuclear. But at present this level only ensures equal danger. Security in the context of the new political thinking is guaranteed not by an extremely high but rather an extremely low level of strategic parity, from which both nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction should be excluded. This idea was contained in the address by USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs E. A. Shevardnadze at the 43rd Session on the UN General Assembly.

Genuine security can be achieved only by political means, free of ideological disagreements and conflicts. The aim is not for socialism and capitalism to sacrifice their ideologies for the sake of the survival of mankind but rather for the rivals to get rid of ideologized approaches to forming intergovernmental relations and to be able to rise above ideological disagreements in matters of war and peace, which embody the interests of all mankind. Ideologies may be polar opposites, but the interest of survival and preventing war is universal and supreme. For this reason the Soviet Union advocates deideologization of international relations, and in particular the exclusion of the "image of the enemy" from political dialogue.

The impression is created, however, that in the West they are having great difficulty in parting with this stereotype from the "cold war" days, a stereotype which is convenient for militarism. As substantiation we shall cite the U.S. magazine *MILITARY REVIEW*. Its authors write both of "the West's growing concern over a conventional-arms blitzkrieg launched by the Soviet and the Warsaw Pact in NATO's Central Region," about "the growing specter of direct Soviet military intervention throughout the world," and about our MiG-29 aircraft as a "threat of Soviet air superiority over the West," but not about innovative approaches in Soviet

military policy. We feel that such a tendentious and distorted picture of the Soviet Union will not give anybody any additional confidence about the future.

The new thinking signifies rejection of the illusion that in the nuclear age security can be obtained through military technology. Today international disputes can be resolved only by political means, through dialogue, and with the participation of all interested parties. No matter how great the differences in countries' political and social systems, the main thing today is the interdependence and interlinkage of the world as a whole and of the individual countries.

In this connection we should also mention such a key element of the new political thinking as freedom of choice. It is dictated by the world's growing diversity. No one state can dictate or impose its own ideological and political schemes on other peoples, even if in that country's opinion these ideological and political schemes are correct.

Freedom of choice of path of development is absolute and cannot be halted by "crusades," but can only be acknowledged. Today the interests of mankind as a whole should be constructed taking into account the interests of all peoples and countries. Our country is undertaking consistent steps to defuse crisis situations on a basis of justice, fairness, and honesty. The Geneva accords pertaining to a political settlement of the Afghanistan question are a genuine manifestation of these efforts. This model is fully applicable to resolving conflicts in Southern Africa, in the Near East, and in Central America, where international law is being constantly violated.

At the special session of the USSR Supreme Soviet in October 1988 M. S. Gorbachev emphasized: "Our course in international affairs is clear. It is a course directed toward eliminating the danger of nuclear catastrophe, toward normalization of international relations, establishment of relations between the world's countries and peoples grounded on equal rights and mutual benefit, at extensive cooperation in the most diverse areas, and at securing for every people the right freely to choose its own destiny." Some impetuous individuals interpreted these words to mean an immediate rejection of the military and are preaching pacifistic attitudes. One must clearly understand, however, that absolute effectiveness of the new thinking is possible in conditions of universality, worldwide winning over of the minds of peoples and their governments. And until such time as a reliable political mechanism for preventing war has been created, a high degree of combat readiness on the part of our Armed Forces, including the members of our Air Forces, will play a genuine role of guarantor of the peaceful labor of the Soviet people.

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AUSTRIA

Envoys Assess CFE/CSBM Results as 'Positive'

AU1207205889 Vienna Television Service in German
2000 GMT 12 Jul 89

[Adalbert Krause report]

[Excerpts] Vienna's image in summer is characterized by tourists, and the two big CSCE conferences will start their summer recess this week. The results are very positive so far.

Ambassador Adam Meiszter, head of the Hungarian delegation, for instance, confirms that in his country the Soviet troop reductions, but also the reductions of the Hungarian forces themselves, will be continued. Then, answering a question about Hungary's neutralization, which has been repeatedly proposed, he makes the remarkable statement that, even though the issue is not topical, Hungary's policy is aimed at creating a situation that is almost equal to a neutralization.

It almost seems as if the dynamism of the process of political democratization, particularly in Hungary and Poland, but also the disarmament goals of the United States and the Soviet Union are now overtaking the work of the conference on confidence-building measures.

[Begin recording] [Guenter Joetze, head of the FRG delegation] Dynamism is one thing, but careful work on the individual parts of the new structure is a different one. This will take a very long time, even if the negotiations of the 23 states on reductions get a dynamism that might quickly lead to the first successes. Building the structure, the cooperative structure of security in Europe, remains a great task. [end recording] [passage omitted]

What, from the viewpoint of neutral Austria, are the prospects for progress in the field of confidence-building measures?

[Begin recording] [Martin Vukovich, head of the Austrian delegation] I think trust is an important precondition for creating readiness for troop reductions. This political trust has been established step-by-step over the past few years, and the really very promising conditions of East-West relations and also the developments in individual East European countries, which are firmly determined to make budget cuts in the military field, raise the possibilities for concluding a first agreement on the reduction of conventional armed forces in Europe within the foreseeable future. [end recording]

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Foreign Minister Genscher Hails CFE/CSBM Second Round

LD1307095189 Hamburg DPA in German
0904 GMT 13 Jul 89

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher made a decidedly positive assessment of the second round of negotiations on conventional forces in Europe [CFE] and on further confidence-building measures [CSBM], which ended in Vienna today. The talks had been marked by "unusual dynamism" and gave grounds for hope of a breakthrough in the efforts for agreed stability, according to a statement by Genscher circulated in Bonn.

The reduction of tanks and infantry combat vehicles to equal upper limits, proposed by the West, was accepted by the East. For its part, the West gave ground on the Soviet concern for including combat aircraft and helicopters in the reductions from the start, and limiting U.S. and USSR troop strength in Europe to 275,000 men each.

In Genscher's view, the proposals made early this morning in Vienna by the West, to fix the overall upper limits at 5,700 combat aircraft and 1,900 combat helicopters, create the conditions necessary for achieving a substantial result within a year. The East should carry out a constructive examination of these new proposals during the pause in negotiations.

Defense Minister Stoltenberg's First Months in Office Viewed

AU1907133889 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER
RUNDSCHAU in German 19 Jul 89 p 3

[Edgar Auth commentary: "Stoltenberg's Small Steps"]

[Text] FRG Defense Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg has small bits of success to his credit. Since he assumed office in the Defense Ministry, the Bundeswehr has escaped the center of criticism. There is the impression that it might start solving its future problems without being disturbed.

Even though the Brussels NATO summit left some wishes open concerning Bonn's desire to ease the burden of short-range nuclear missiles, a course toward calmer waters was charted for the alliance and the FRG defense minister. Now, just at the beginning of the vacations, NATO presented its comprehensive proposal at the Vienna negotiations on conventional armed forces. The fact that combat aircraft have been included—following U.S. President Bush's plan—finally shows that it is not only Gorbachev who has something to offer.

This is also what Stoltenberg, who did not look back behind Foreign Minister Genscher in the conflict about short-range nuclear weapons, lives on. Then the new

man in the Defense Ministry had to analyze the internal situation of the Bundeswehr, and obviously decided that renovation is necessary. This is called the "attractiveness program." DM400 million are made available for new posts, promotions for first sergeants, captains, and majors, and for a number of other social improvements for the troops. Expense allowances and hardship allowances will be raised, discharge pay for those doing military service will be more than doubled. This creates loyalty among the men in uniform, who already feared retreat into internal isolation from our democracy in view of their declining popularity among the public.

Stoltenberg's most important and most symbolic step, however, is the allocation of one ten-thousandths of his budget to arms control. Thus, the minister is cautiously putting his foot on the threshold to the future. Many military men are pleased to see this because they also need meaningful jobs when the feeling of being threatened is gone.

However, Stoltenberg has dared to make only small steps so far. Among the big problems that put a strain on the future, there is the Fighter 90 combat plane, which is tearing an enormous hole in the defense minister's budget without there being a conclusive military justification for it. The Army does not need ever more expensive toys if soldiers and citizens are running away from it. Recently a 5-percent price increase at current costs of DM5.85 billion only for the development of the combat jet were cited. Additional costs alone eat up more than half of Stoltenberg's entire attractiveness program. The minister has warned the price pushers. However, whether he is really going to stop the project if new demands accumulate remains to be seen. Obviously, the project, for which total expenditures of at least DM100 to DM150 billion are predicted, essentially serves to provide basic equipment for a super corporation that is struggling to be internationally competitive with its West European partners in the production. However, the military future belongs to intelligent weapons—electronic, unmanned systems.

The second big problem is troop strength, and thus, consequently, the structure of the FRG Army. Upon assuming office, Stoltenberg made assurances that he intends to adhere to the current target strength of 495,000 soldiers in peacetime. In view of the low birth-rate due to the pill, this is hardly possible without extending compulsory military service or tapping new sources of recruits and, in view of progressive political detente, not even necessary. Stoltenberg's soldiers have long known—if they think independently—that the hole in the ozone layer, the raw material crisis, and hunger in the Third World are a much greater danger than the Russians.

Therefore, a big leap is necessary, a new defensive structure within the framework of a purely defensive strategy. The Soviets, too, are gradually changing toward a defensive army and are reducing their highly mobile

attack forces, as observers report. However, obviously Kohl's latest hopeful in the Defense Ministry thinks that he cannot overtask the allies with a corresponding step at present. Because the Bundeswehr, as the strongest alliance army in Europe, considers itself the "bellwether," it is feared that, in case of a reduction of the Bundeswehr, the Netherlands, Belgians, and Scandinavians will start even more drastic military cuts.

This is the reason that Stoltenberg announced only very quietly something that would be a propaganda hit in disarmament policy under Gorbachev: namely, the fact that several tens of thousands of the 495,000 soldiers are no longer in the barracks. Despite noble restraint concerning the question of future troop strength, a corresponding concept is needed—and composure toward the partners. Whether Stoltenberg—who already had problems with the tax reform, the "work of the century"—can afford this must be doubted until the contrary is proved.

Progress Toward Chemical Weapons Ban Welcomed

*AU1907125589 Hamburg DIE WELT in German
19 Jul 89 p 1*

[Commentary by Berndt Conrad: "A Breakthrough?"]

[Text] The hope that it might be possible to achieve a worldwide ban on chemical weapons is becoming more realistic. If the Americans and the Soviets have really reached bilateral agreement on important points, one can assume that the Geneva disarmament conference will finally come closer to the goal it set itself 8 years ago.

Verification has been the decisive obstacle so far. The West has rightly insisted on international on-site inspections and particularly on controls in cases of suspicion. When Moscow, which remained opposed to this for a long time, adopted the same course, the United States began to express doubts regarding the technical possibilities of exact controls. Doubts as to whether the observation and searching of private companies was permitted by the Constitution emerged as well. If the superpowers should succeed in removing these concerns and arrive at a consensus, this would be a great step forward.

This would be a particular relief for the FRG, not because we are keeping large stores of chemical weapons, but, among other things, because the FRG, as a pioneer of a global ban, has renounced the production of biological and chemical weapons and has, as the only state so far, accepted international on-site inspections. This is why the participation of German companies in the construction of a chemical weapons plant in Libya, for which increasing evidence was produced after initial doubts, aroused so much anger in this country—and among our allies.

As a matter of fact, the danger that we are facing today is that unpredictable forces, particularly in the Third World, might procure chemical weapons and threaten their neighbors. This has already become cruel reality in the Gulf war. This development must be stopped.

SPD Wants End to Low-Altitude Military Flights
AU1707122089 Hamburg BILD AM SONNTAG in German 16 Jul 89 p 5

["fwm" report: "SPD Wants To Stop All Low-Altitude Flights Over Inhabited Areas"]

[Text] The Socialist Party of Germany [SPD] wants first to reduce and then completely eliminate low-altitude military flights by means of a two-stage plan. For this purpose, Erwin Horn, SPD representative in the Defense Committee, proposes joint action by all parties. He told BILD AM SONNTAG: "As a first step, the FRG Air Force should stop all low-altitude flights over inhabited areas. Then, the FRG defense minister must present a new Air Force concept which facilitates the complete renunciation of low-altitude flights. The result should be made part of the Vienna disarmament negotiations—with the aim of having the East and the West completely stop low-altitude flights over German territory at the same time."

Horn thinks: "The East will certainly be ready for this by 1990, if the West really wants it. This would not only ease the strain on the German population, but would also mean the end of the ability to attack of the air forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact in Europe."

FINLAND

Arms Control Moves Spark Policy Debate

Defense Forces Commander Rejects Cuts
36170076z Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 4 Apr 89 p 7

[Article: "General Valtanen Rejects Weapons Reductions for Finland"]

[Text] General Jaakko Valtanen, commander of the defense forces, on Monday rejected as unrealistic talk of reducing Finland's armaments.

According to the general, Finland's defense forces are performing the tasks assigned to them with minimal forces. If the tasks of the defense forces were to be changed, this would be reflected before long in security policy and in Finland's credibility. "There is surely no reason for that, and no one wants it. Credible neutrality has become a recognized and valued hallmark for our country," said Valtanen at the opening of a national defense course in Helsinki.

Valtanen noted that in Europe we are living through a period of detente and reduction of excess armament and in an atmosphere of great changes and optimistic expectations for peace. "Many people are asking optimistically: 'Shouldn't we now join in arms reduction—in order to set a good example?' Since no one is threatening Finland, they say, why should we keep acquiring interceptors to replace old ones and why should we retain a universal military obligation and train reservists for large numbers of ground forces? In general, why do we keep wasting funds on national defense, since permanent peace has already broken out!"

Valtanen answered those questions by observing that the universal military obligation has continually proved to be the cheapest and most democratic system. Finland's real military defense capability comes into being only when rather large numbers of reservists trained as ground forces are mobilized.

Without the Air Force and Navy, Finland would not be able to patrol its area, collect information, and protect itself against incursions into its territory. "The number of planes in the Air Force and the number of ships in the Navy are the minimum with which the assigned tasks can be performed at all satisfactorily.

"When one examines the tasks and capabilities of the defense forces, their available manpower, and the ability of our system to act in light of the prevailing situation, it seems that nothing has happened nor can any rapid changes be expected in the military balance between the great powers and in the military balance of power in Europe that would make it possible for Finland to change the direction of its security policy," Valtanen said.

Norrback Wants a Hundred Officers

Defense minister Ole Norrback (Swedish Party) discussed during the opening session of the national defense course the problems of the defense forces that arise from UN peace-keeping activity.

The minister noted that there are each year about one hundred officers, warrant officers, and specialists on UN assignments. Because Finland will probably continue to participate "strongly" in future peace-keeping activity, it is Norrback's opinion that over a hundred additional officer positions should be authorized in order that training and readiness of the defense forces not be endangered.

The government has decided to reduce the number of state positions by about a thousand, but in Norrback's opinion that decision should not prevent "establishment of generally authorized new positions."

The minister proposed that the law should provide a guaranteed work relationship for men employed by private employers or municipalities who leave for UN assignments. He noted that in other Nordic countries such an employment guarantee has been provided.

One problem arising from UN assignments is that the Army has loaned to UN troops a large amount of equipment. Norrback estimated that it is probably not possible to lend more than the present amount without affecting the operations of the defense forces.

If the UN operation in Namibia lasts more than the planned one year, the defense forces should begin to obtain replacement equipment.

Researcher Urges Changes

36170076z Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 7 Apr 89 p 7

[Article: "Joenniemi Would Reform Defense Policy: 'Finland Has No Use for Massive Ground Forces'"]

[Text] Researcher Pertti Joenniemi of the Peace Research Institute in Tampere is proposing a thorough reevaluation of Finland's defense policy. In the opinion of the peace researcher, Finland's defense policy has had a stable and unchanging line, but this has led to "distortions" in practical defense matters.

Joenniemi thinks, for example, that no use can be envisioned for massive ground forces, and the ground forces, which are in numbers the highest in Europe, are not of interest to anyone as a political signal. Large ground forces are in Joenniemi's opinion only "a sign of a defense policy that is behind times."

Special researcher Joenniemi presented his ideas for reevaluating defense policy in an article written for the publication ULKOPOLITIIKKA [Foreign Policy]. The "defense revision" proposed by Joenniemi has occurred twice in Finland: in the 1920's and after the second world war. Defense policy is now being considered by the committee headed by Jaakko Iloniemi, before which Joenniemi has also testified.

Joenniemi writes that thinking about Finland's defense policy has been dominated by "a doctrine of some kind of marginal threat." It has been thought that there will be considerable time to mobilize forces, and the threat has been assumed to be directed at a large area of Finland as a whole.

"To counter the threat, a certain kind of invasion defense has been built up, in which ground forces with large numbers of men play a central role. It has been thought that they are the real "lock" and the frightening message that will deter beforehand plans directed against Finland. The most important thing has been to avoid military "vacuums" and to have our own forces cover the entire area of Finland.

In Joenniemi's opinion this kind of doctrine has become questionable and should be given up. In Finland we cannot start from the assumption that there will be enough time to mobilize our own forces, and there are no guarantees that the great powers and military alliances would allocate their military forces here only marginally, suitably for Finland. Even a military threat will affect only limited portions of Finland's territory. Joenniemi also considers nuclear war a possibility.

Joenniemi thinks that the focus of defense policy should be area patrol and preparation for crises and threats of war, not preparation for war. Instead of massive reserves of ground forces, Finland should have a military force that can be used rapidly.

Joenniemi also writes that the importance of foreign policy is increasing. "The message that Finland will not under any circumstances—for instance in connection with naval visits—permit nuclear weapons on its territory is more important than ever before. If our policy is not credible in this regard in the eyes of all parties, we may easily be led into speculations and possibly even into the area of superpower nuclear weapons plans."

Estonian, Finnish Christians for Nordic Nuclear-Free Zone

52002427 Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 19 Jun 89 p 10

[Text] The Estonian and Finnish Christian alliances joined in calling for the establishment of a Nordic nuclear-free zone. The alliances state in their joint communique that this would create more security and be a constructive example for other nations.

The parliamentary group of the Finnish Christian League visited Estonia last week as guests of the Estonian Christian Alliance. The organizations expressed a shared concern for moral development in contemporary society. "A universal sense of individual responsibility and wholesome ethical, Christian principles are an unconditional prerequisite for secure economic and social developments," the organizations declared.

The organizations also share the ideals of national self-determination, advancement of democracy and of the indispensability of a multiparty system as the bedrock for stable and secure social development. Both organizations articulated the hope that such development will continue positively and peacefully throughout the Baltic republics.

Pollution of the Baltic Sea was also discussed during the meeting. Both organizations demand that measures be taken to repair the damage done so that the health of the sea's ecosystem may be preserved.

Included in the group of visiting parliamentarians were, among others, party chief Esko Almgren, party secretary Jouko Jaaskelainen, and Parliament members Jorma Fred and Toimi Kankaanniemi.

FRANCE

Chief of Staff on Disarmament, Reorganization
PM2007092889 Paris LE FIGARO in French
13 Jul 89 p 9

[Interview with Armed Forces Chief of Staff General Maurice Schmitt by Pierre Darcourt; date and place of interview not given]

[Excerpt] LE FIGARO: General, do you think that the change in the Soviet attitude and the resulting demobilizing effect should change France's defense policy?

Maurice Schmitt: This week I received General Moiseyev, my Soviet counterpart, the chief of the most powerful army in the world, at least in the conventional and chemical spheres. I spoke to him in the following way:

I am pleased that we can restore relations between our two Armed Forces. When you talk with each other in a friendly way, you do not wage war, not even cold war, and this is a good thing. The French welcome the current arms control talks. They will certainly not do anything to hamper them, but they will take care to safeguard their interests, especially their security. We are not threatening anyone but, to cite an expression used by Mikhail Gorbachev in the book "Perestroika": "It is our duty to our people to maintain a reliable and modern defense." France is an independent power. It intends to contribute to the balance in Europe that will enable the development of relations of trust between the peoples of our continent.

"Adequate" defense based on the deterrence of the strong by the weak is a concept we invented and we do not intend to change it because we do not want our independent decisionmaking process to be the object of any blackmail or to depend on a third party. France is peace loving. The fact that it takes responsibility for its own defense makes it a reliable partner for its allies, and more generally in international life.

LE FIGARO: Repeated announcements of spectacular disarmament initiatives are making news increasingly frequently. Do the facts live up to the statements?

Maurice Schmitt: You are right to say that: There are statements and there is action. For the first time there is action, and we must welcome that. The agreement on intermediate-range weapons is being implemented and well monitored, and this is a great first.

However, after reaffirming that there are still considerable East-West imbalances, I would like to stress that disarmament should not be carried out in a chaotic way. Arms control should remove the risks of war by increasing stability, and not the reverse. The Warsaw Pact is reducing its forces because it cannot do otherwise. Indeed, the main aim is to try to improve an economy that is in a bad state for many reasons. The scale of military spending, which is four times more than ours per capita as a percentage of GDP, is certainly one of those reasons.

If we want to achieve a positive result, we must remain vigilant throughout the process which, in the conventional sphere, at least in Europe—including the European part of Russia—ought to lead to a security balance at a lower and more reasonable level. But I would particularly like to say one thing, and in so doing to push the argument to its limits. There is a situation that would be unacceptable—a situation in which the USSR and the United States would maintain nuclear weapons, however few, and Europe, especially France, would not have any. You can imagine the political consequences of such a scenario...which, moreover, we have already experienced.

LE FIGARO: In recent weeks the foreign press has stressed our technological dependence on the Americans in the nuclear sphere. Is this not the sign of a gradual reintegration into NATO?

Maurice Schmitt: You are referring to an article in FOREIGN POLICY which casts doubt on our capabilities. There are certainly some people who were disturbed by the fact that we build our submarines, our launchers, and all our missiles ourselves, and we also construct our nuclear weapons ourselves. A recent film called "The Adventure of Deterrence" said all that could be said on that subject. It clearly shows that we are independent at all levels. Moreover, our tests help give credibility to the whole and thus strengthen our nuclear deterrent. I think that is clear. Allow me to cite an expression I like: The deterrent is intended not to be used, but it serves every day on which peace reigns, at least in Europe. As I told Gen Moiseyev, we want to prevent war, and not just nuclear war....

LE FIGARO: The defense minister has just announced implementation of the "Armed Forces 2000" plan which makes provision for a vast reorganization of the Armed Forces. Did it not surprise the general staffs by its suddenness and scale?

Maurice Schmitt: It is a plan that covers several spheres. Some provisions are still being studied. Several factors had made a reorganization necessary years ago.

First, there is the reassessment of the threats to Europe and to our country. Second, there is the need to adapt to the new equipment that is going to enter into service.

We, therefore, had to examine the efficiency of our organization with the greatest attention. Moreover, the optimum use of our limited financial resources, the reduction in manning levels, which hits particularly hard with regard to officers, dictated a tightening of structures and locations, which I have constantly advocated for several years; for instance, in 1988, after hearing me speak, a deputy told his National Defense Commission colleagues: "You cannot ask General Schmitt to rationalize the running of the Armed Forces and, at the same time, deny him the only effective means of achieving that."

I am therefore playing a full part in this plan, which will essentially be implemented in 1990 and 1991 and which aims to transfer officers and thus give more muscle to operational units. I am counting on everyone's sense of civic duty to avoid obstacles to implementation, because we will have to go a long way especially when reviewing territorial organization, the administration, support, and schools, and we will have to do so in all bodies which have anything to do with defense.

The people most directly concerned will naturally be career soldiers and civilian defense staff. They know that any body has a constant need to adapt. Egotistical behavior must not jeopardize this difficult but vital reform. The aim is to set up a modern and stable defense organization adapted to the challenges of coming decades. [passage omitted]

Hades Short-Range Nuclear Missile Tests Successfully

*AU2007154189 Paris AFP in English
1524 GMT 20 Jul 89*

[Text] Paris, July 20 (AFP)—The third test firing of France's new-generation Hades nuclear missile took place "with success" at a test range in southwestern France, the French Defense Ministry said Thursday.

The test was carried out Wednesday at the Landes Test Center, the ministry said.

The Hades, France's latest short-range surface-to-surface nuclear missile, is due to go into service beginning in 1992 and will replace the Pluton missile.

The Hades has a maximum range of 480 kilometers (290 miles).

Two previous test firings took place on November 22, 1988 and on March 8 of this year.

ITALY

Envoy Urges Speedup of CD Work on Chemical Weapons Ban

*AU2007124489 Rome ANSA in English
1220 GMT 20 Jul 89*

[Text] (ANSA) Geneva, July 20—Italy on Thursday called on the Disarmament Conference [CD] here to speed up the timetable for a treaty to ban chemical weapons.

"Our government is concerned that the occasion will be missed to completely eliminate these hideous weapons and end the risk of their proliferation," the Italian delegation chief, Ambassador Aldo Pugliese, told the conference.

After complaining over the little progress made in the past few months, Ambassador Pugliese affirmed that the Geneva conference must center on finding solutions to the crucial problems in discussion and worry about details at a later date. In particular, he said, Italy is convinced that the question of verification has been resolved, with the general acceptance of on-site challenge inspection, and remaining obstacles can be overcome through the political willingness and spirit of compromise which has been shown.

"We must deal concretely with the most important problems at hand and avoid academic debate which can only distract our attention," Ambassador Pugliese said.

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